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PUSHKIN AT 200
Catharine Theimer Nepomnyashchy
Pushkin is the Russian person as he will develop, as he will perhaps appear 
two hundred years from now.
Nikolai Gogol
Like a first love, you
Russia’s heart will never forget... 
Fedor Tyutchev
Pushkin is our all.
Apollon Grigoriev
J
une 6, 1999, the two-hundredth anniversary of the 
birth of Alexander Pushkin, marked the high point 
of the year-long commemoration of the most 
important Pushkin jubilee in the past half century. The 
birthday festivities in Moscow were capped by a gala 
at the Bolshoi Theater. With Moscow mayor and 
potential presidential candidate Yury Luzhkov looking 
on from the third row, the smorgasbord spectacle 
opened with a filmed statement by Russia's grand old 
man of culture, the noted medievalist Dmitry 
Likhachev, who was to pass away only a few months 
later. Setting the tone for the evening's festivities, 
Likhachev began his brief remarks by acknowledging 
that it was with a "tremor of the soul" that he took up 
the "incredibly difficult" task of saying "something 
very substantive, something fundamental about 
Pushkin." Likhachev then proceeded to validate his 
concern by reading a statement mired in cliche: 
Pushkin is Russia's Shakespeare, Cervantes, Dante, 
Homer; among his most characteristic traits is "the 
perception of the world as good and beautiful. Pushkin 
created and affirmed the language of Russian culture. 
Language is not only the words we all use. It is the 
images, concepts, symbols in which we express our 
thoughts, our ideas, our worldview." Tellingly, 
Likhachev concluded his remarks with a quotation, 
what he termed the "best" of the "very many statements 
about Pushkin," the famous passage from Gogol's "A 
Few Words About Pushkin":
Pushkin is an extraordinary phenomenon and 
perhaps the sole phenomenon of the Russian 




“Seven days left until Pushkin's birthday. " Literary Cafe, St. 
Petersburg.
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develop, as he will appear in two hundred 
years. In him Russian nature, the Russian 
soul, the Russian language, the Russian char­
acter were reflected with the same purity, with 
the same beauty with which a landscape is 
reflected on the convex surface of an optical 
glass.
The rest of the evening was devoted to performances of 
musical numbers based on Pushkin's works—ranging 
from excerpts from the ballet The Fountain of 
Bakhchisarai and the opera Boris Godunov to ro­
mances—alternating with solemn recitations from 
Pushkin's poetry and readings from the more canonical 
memoirs by the poet's contemporaries.
The backdrop against which these performances 
took place, moreover, provided the most compelling 
visual metaphor not only for the Bolshoi concert, but, 
more to the point, for the Pushkin jubilee as a whole. 
Throughout the scene changes accompanying the 
musical numbers, the backdrop remained blue, varying 
from the light blue of the daytime sky to the deep blue 
of the night or, perhaps more to the point, the cosmos, 
with quotations from Pushkin fanning out in rays from 
the center. That center remained empty, only subtly lit 
by clouds or haze, until the finale. Then, as a boy 
dressed as the adolescent Pushkin walked out to center 
stage reciting "To Chaadaev"— Pushkin's stirring 1818 
lyric calling on Russia's youth to place their finest 
emotions at the service of Russia, which will surely 
awaken from its sleep—in the center of the backdrop 
appeared a spectrally white profile of the young 
Pushkin, and the stage filled with waltzing couples. 
Perhaps no image could better have captured what the 
observance of the Pushkin bicentennial had to tell us 
about Russia—that it is a culture trapped in the texts of 
its own past and yet, in a strangely nostalgic fashion, 
yearning for rebirth, for a new center to anchor signifi­
cation.
Of course, it is hardly a revelation to note that, as 
early as Pushkin’s own lifetime and with increasing 
magnitude and intensity since his death, the poet has 
served, especially at key moments of anniversary 
commemorations, as a screen onto which Russia's most 
eloquent apologists and most powerful political forces 
as well as simply average Russians have projected their 
most fervid, sometimes utopian aspirations, in the 
process revealing their deepest anxieties about what it 
means to be Russian. Indeed, not only Pushkin's own 
words, but those of his contemporaries and of those
who came later, often fellow writers, who most elo­
quently, aptly, hyperbolically encapsulated Pushkin's 
significance have become an emotionally charged 
idiolect of Russian, a language within a language, a net 
of quotations in which all Russians—at least those "of 
a certain age"—are entangled as pervasively, but far 
more complicitly, than English speakers are by Shake­
speare or the King James Bible.
I
n the days leading up to the jubilee celebration on 
June 6, while the most prestigious "Pushkin places" 
in the land (from the family estate at 
Mikhailovskoe in the Pskov Region to the Moika 
Museum in the apartment where Pushkin died in 
Petersburg to the Pushkin apartment museum on the 
Old Arbat in Moscow) were being hurriedly prepared 
for public openings and visits by political figures, 
quotations from the poet moved out into the streets, 
displayed on banners spanning main thoroughfares, 
posters, and billboards. The most pervasive manifesta­
tion of public Pushkiniana in Petersburg was the 
appearance in prominent spots from Senate Square to 
Nevsky Prospect of an attractive, oversized, free­
standing poster. One of Pushkin's own self-caricatures 
adorned the top with a sketch of the statue of the 
Bronze Horseman at the bottom, both images superim­
posed on a ground of Pushkin's words in his own 




Bronze Horseman, "I love you, creation of Peter," 
displayed in prominent red letters in the center of the 
poster. By the same token, a banner at the head of 
Nevsky Prospect sported the same sketch of Pushkin 
and another well-known line from his "Petersburg 
Tale," "Be beautiful, city of Peter." These same 
quotations, complete with representations of the Bronze 
Horseman and Pushkin, were also "broadcast" in 
periodic sequence with commercial announcements and 
advertisements on the computerized display towering 
over Petersburg's Ploshchad’ vosstaniya farther down 
Nevsky. Petersburg, the city where Pushkin lived much 
of his life and where he died, was agressively claiming 
its native son.
Pushkin's natal Moscow, however, ceded nothing to 
Petersburg in its self-serving citation of Pushkin and 
would easily seem to have outdone the "second capital" 
in whimsy, messianism, and kitschy juxtapositions. 
Upholding Muscovite claims to priority in Pushkin's 
affections, the electronic billboard perched over the 
entrance to the Intourist Hotel situated near the begin­
ning of Tverskaya, Moscow's main street, included in 
its computerized series a digitized version of the 
famous Kiprensky portrait of Pushkin with the citation 
from Eugene Onegin, "Moscow! How much that 
sound conveys..." Off to the other side of Red Square, 
a building on Myasnitskaya Street, rather incongru­
ously situated immediately across the street from the 
American flag shaped neon sign for the US Cafe, 
boasted a three-story-high poster of a picture of a tower 
in the Kremlin wall from the days of horsedrawn 
carriages with another purported Pushkin quotation at 
the bottom: "Moscow! How I loved you, my sacred 
homeland..." A more subtle, wittier territorial appropri­
ation of Pushkin was to be found among the series of 
billboards displayed on the Garden Ring Road and on 
the highway to Sheremetevo. One such billboard 
inspired by The Bronze Horseman sported a drenched 
Evgeny, looking suspiciously like Pushkin himself, 
sitting on an equally drenched and drooping lion 
surrounded by flood waters over the first line of 
Pushkin's poem: "On the bank by deserted waves..." 
Petersburg, Moscow seemed to be saying, treated 
Pushkin rather badly. Other striking billboards in the 
series suggested a link between Pushkin and the most 
basic of emotional and conceptual associations. Each 
displayed a single word—"passion," "poet" (with the 
Kiprensky portrait of Pushkin), "love" (with a portrait 
of Pushkin's wife Natalia Goncharova). Seemingly 
drawing on "teaser" techniques of Western advertising,
"Whether I wander along noisy streets..." (Moscow).
these graphics betoken the primitive, potent appeal not 
only of Pushkin's much mythologized figure, but also 
of his words, rote memorized by generations of Rus­
sians to become the common currency of their emotive 
discourse. Hence, the sentimental, wistful, even enig­
matic tug at the heartstrings by the decontextualized 
Pushkin quotations on banners over central Moscow 
streets: "I loved you," "...a year will pass, and I'll 
appear to you...," "For the sake of familial love and 
tender friendship...," "...Whether I wander along noisy 
streets...," "We are bom for inspiration," "Save me, my 
talisman," and, at the center of town right in front of 
Red Square, "Bless Moscow, Russia!" Most poignant 
of all, perhaps, was the quotation at the top of the huge 
banner of a pensive Pushkin draped over the facade of 
the Moscow Hotel in Manege Square: "God let peace 
and quiet be resurrected in the whole universe."
While Pushkin's own words were suspended over 
the Russian landscape, official ceremonies were 
dominated by cliches coined by his eulogists. The
3
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standard for the commingling of hyperbole, slogan, and 
political posturing was set on the morning of June 6 at 
the opening of the jubilee celebration in Moscow on 
Pushkin Square. It would have been impossible to 
gauge the mass attraction of the Pushkin celebration 
from this event given the fact that one could pass 
through multiple cordons blocking entry to the square 
only by presenting a hierarchically coded invitation, 
with Russia's current elite, including Zyuganov and 
Zhirinovsky, occupying bleachers facing the newly 
cleaned Opekushin statue of Pushkin, while lesser 
guests were coralled in quadrants on Tverskaya Street. 
Young women in garish outfits pertly catered to the 
honored guests, dispensing soft drinks, while roving 
vendors hawked head pieces with bobbing antennae to 
the milling crowd.
The proceedings were appropriately solemn. The 
motley lineup of speakers was in itself telling: 
Luzhkov was followed by then Prime Minister 
Stephashin, the Solnechnogorsk Archbishop Sergiyi 
standing in as emissary for Patriarch Aleksei, the poet 
and President of the International Pushkin Committee 
Vladimir Kostrov, the artistic director of the Maly 
Theater Yury Solomin, and an academician. While 
Luzhkov emphasized the importance of the celebration 
not only to Russia, but to world civilization, Stepashin 
waxed eloquent on Pushkin's all-pervasive significance, 
explicitly equating the poet with Russia and its aspira­
tions: "Pushkin is Russia....Pushkin loved our country, 
loved Russia, believed in it as we must today." The 
patriarch, in remarks read by the metropolitan, drawing 
on Dostoevsky's "Pushkin Speech" pronounced by the 
writer almost on the same spot in 1880, portrayed 
Pushkin as a great reconciler, a model of love of the 
fatherland, while Kostrov, a minor poet at best, regaled 
the crowd with his own verses envisaging the curly- 
headed Pushkin leading Russia safely along the edge of 
the abyss and ending with the ringing words:
With you we will never vanish.
With Pushkin we will emerge victorious.
It was, however, the academician who, in this 
poignant fest of national pride, allowed himself the 
most hyperbolic juxtaposition: "It is probably a great 
symbol that in these years of material ruin and spiritual 
degradation we have been granted almost simulta­
neously two great holidays: the bicentenary of the birth 
of Pushkin and the bimillenary of the birth of Christ." 
The opening ceremony concluded with a presentation
of flowers to the newly cleaned Opekushin monument 
by an honor guard goose-stepping to the music of a 
military band followed by a dance exhibition of waltz­
ing couples in the center of the closed Tverskaya Street.
The claims made in this opening ceremony and 
throughout the official and unofficial rhetoric of the 
Pushkin jubilee to Pushkin as a gauge of Russia's 
legitimacy and goodness were clear, as was the appeal 
to nostalgia signalled by the seemingly ubiquitous 
waltzing figures in ersatz finery in a nineteenth-century 
mode. Yet it would be difficult to say whether the 
attempt on the part of Russia's current leaders up to and 
including Yeltsin himself (who claimed to have been 
burning the midlight oil reading Pushkin at 2 in the 
morning on the eve of the jubilee) to appropriate 
Pushkin, following the tsarist government a century 
earlier and Stalin fifty years before, as a source of 
political capital was successful. For all the bombast, 
the main attraction of the jubilee for the Russian 
populace at large was as an excuse for a day off from 
work and a holiday from the rigors of everyday life in 
Russia today.
Certainly the atmosphere in the streets in the center 
of Moscow, closed throughout the day to all but 
pedestrian traffic, was festive, as people, enjoying the 
good weather, strolled from bandstand to bandstand 
constructed in the shape of waltzing figures. Pushkin's 
profile in caricature presided over the party, on little 
banners and bright-colored balloons (which seem to 
have been almost the extent of the merchandising, 
along with Pushkin vodka, which was hard to find) and, 
apparently in response to a Luzhkov mandate, on all 
storefronts from McDonald's to Tiffany's. With star­
tling irony, the primary venue for children, decorated 
with scenes, from Pushkin's skazki, was set up on 
Lubyanka Square right in front of the former KGB 
headquarters, once the dreaded threshold of the Stalin 
purges, with the giant head from Pushkin's Ruslan and 
Ludmila sitting roughly on the spot from which the 
towering statue of Feliks Dzerzhinsky had been re­
moved in the wake of the attempted coup in August 
1991.
Commentators after the fact pointed out that some 
of the quotations bedecking Moscow during the jubilee 
days were not in fact quotations from Pushkin. And 
quizzes about Pushkin's life and works administered to 
passersby on the streets revealed some rather large gaps 
in knowledge, as evidenced by two men who solemnly 




Larina and one who claimed the poet's wife had been 
Anna Karenina. Pushkin, in fact, seemed to be largely 
absent from the celebration, serving merely as a place 
marker for the amorphous text of Russia's past. Per­
haps of all the quotations about Pushkin reiterated ad 
nauseam during the jubilee days, it was Gogol's famous 
words that were repeated not only most frequently, but 
most aptly. Pushkin as the Russian in two hundred 
year’s seems perpetually to recede into the past and the 
future; he is Russia's own elusive self-definition 
perpetually invoked, yet endlessly deferred.
On the final night of the celebration, which carried 
over to Sunday, June 7,1 headed for Red Square for the 
late night closing ceremony entitled "Golden Voices of 
Russia." I held three tickets for six people, having 
been repeatedly assured that each ticket would admit 
two. At cordons blocking entry to the square, each 
manned by two brawny fellows in dark suits, we were 
informed that only half of our group could enter. My 
protests did no good, but at the second checkpoint 
when I demanded that the security guards give me their 
names, one of them responded without missing a beat, 
"Pushkin." There could have been no more appropriate 
ending to Pushkin's birthday celebration than this 
invocation (conscious or not) of the Pushkin of Pushkin
jokes, Pushkin as absence, Pushkin as the denial of 
responsibility: Who will pay? Pushkin!
Catharine Theimer Nepomnyashchy is Associate 
Director of the Harriman Institute.
The Central Telegraph on Tverskaya (Moscow).
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BIG-BUCK BOOKS:
PULP FICTION IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
Helena Goscilo
"It is easy to brush aside best-seller charts as the product of hype and habit, but they are a real presence in the land of letters, 
generating as much interest as they reflect. And if they do, to an extent, represent the lowest common denominator of the 
print culture, this only strengthens our need to pay attention, since where else is that culture common to all?"
Anthony Lane, "The Top Ten"
"It's [...hard] to compete with the pulp fiction that's printed in hundreds of thousands of copies these days. So I'm [...] 
pleased that I'm able to compete with those trashy writers."
Viktor Pelevin, Interview with Sally Laird
"It's better, I believe, to have a couple of million readers than a dozen of the most respected critics."
Eduard Topol', introduction to Novaia Rossiia v posteli (The New Russia in Bed)
The Textual Fall
B
y now the wholesale visualization of 
contemporary culture, which transpired in the 
West during the 1980s, has fully entrenched 
itself in the urban centers of the former Soviet Union. 
Yet Russians arguably continue to be, as the self- 
congratulatory Soviet cliche insisted, "the most readerly 
nation in the world" ("samyi chitaiushchii narod v 
mire"). Indeed, Valentin Ovchinnikov, the director of 
Biblio-Globus, one of Moscow's largest bookstores, 
prides himself and his domain on that distinction: "As 
before, we remain the greatest country of readers in the 
world" ("My po-prezhnemu ostaemsia samoi 
chitaiushchei stranoi v mire") (Ul'chenko).1 Addicted to
My warm gratitude to those friends and colleagues who in various 
ways have aided and abetted my Marinina mania: Donald Raleigh, 
Nadezhda Azhgikhina, Sasha Prokhorov, Seth Graham, Mark 
Altshuller, Elena Dryzhakova, David Lowe, Mark Lipovetsky, 
Tania Mikhailova, Anja Grothe, Julia Sagaidak, Gerald Janacek, 
Jehanne Gheith, and Tolia and Marat, the Gaulois-loving, leather- 
jacketed duo in Kiev with original insights into crime and Liube.
1. Biblio-Globus on Miasnitskaia (former Kirov) Street is the 
former Soviet Knizhnyi mir, established more than forty years ago, 
renamed in 1992 and now hawking not only literature, art books, 
travel guides, and pulp fiction, but also jewelry, objets d'art, cards, 
posters, video and audio cassettes, computers and technical 
paraphernalia. In recent years it has yielded the offshoot of a
the printed word Russians may be, but their dose has 
shrunk since the Soviet era2 3and their fix no longer 
consists of undiluted political pablum, kirpichb or 
prestige-conferring forbidden fruit by Mandelshtam 
and Solzhenitsyn.
As a visit to any general bookstore or even a 
cursory glance at Ex libris NG and Book Review 
(Knizhnoe obozrenie) reveals,4 popular fiction has 
overrun the book market, forcing High-Culture texts 
out of the limelight and off the shelves. While prophets 
of cultural doom downplay the current explosion in
Cultural Center, overseen by Pavel Vorontsov, and has adopted the 
PR custom of "presentations" and meetings with authors, who sign 
copies of books purchased by customers. On the history and 
current profile of the store, see Ul'chenko.
2. According to G. Matriukhin, deputy chairman of the Russian 
Knizhnaia Palata (Book Chamber), whereas in 1991 Russians 
purchased 10.9 books and monographs per capita, in 1995 that 
index dropped to 3.2 (1940 levels) and in 1996 even further, to 
below 3 volumes per capita (Ivanov 21).
3. Literally, "bricks," an ironic term for fat novels churned out 
during the Soviet era, when the government rewarded writers for 
length, not quality.
4. Whereas Knizhnoe obozrenie used to provide solid data, with 
statistics, about publishing and reading patterns, since 1998 Ex 
Libris NG has surpassed it in virtually all respects as a source of 




book production,5 the Book Chamber (Knizhnaia 
palata), which tracks publishing developments, reports 
33,623 titles released in 1995, approximately 36,000 in 
1996 (Hoffman), and over 43,000 in 1997 and 1998.6 
In terms of gross sales, publishing is the second largest 
industry in Russia today, surpassed only by vodka 
(Ivanov 16). And since books, unlike the eighty-proof 
panacea, typically circulate among multiple borrowers, 
publication numbers reflect only a fraction of de facto 
readership. "Dissidence via literature has evaporated," 
however (Ivanov 17), turning formerly "sacred" texts 
and authors into objects of indifference and 
reconstituting the nature of Russian readership. Runs of 
prize-winning writers like Liudmila Petrushevskaia, 
Viktor Pelevin, and Vladimir Makanin rarely exceed 
11,000 copies,7 and many volumes, especially of 
poetry, appear in even smaller printings of five hundred 
to a thousand copies. That applies even to books 
nominated for prestigious prizes, such as Dina Rubina's 
Escort-Angel (Angel konvoinyi, 1997), a contender for 
the ARSS award.8 By eloquent contrast, murder 
mysteries are routinely reissued in paperback to the 
tune of 100,000 copies, once the hardcover editions 
have become bestsellers.
Similarly, whereas subscriptions to thick journals 
have plummeted so drastically as to imperil their 
survival,9 some of the new glossy magazines that hit the 
stalls in the 1990s flourish and multiply at a prodigious 
rate: Ptiuch, Matador, Imperial, Kul't lichnostei, 
Cosmopolitan/Kosmopoliten, Voiazh, Domovoi, 
Medved', Playboy, Domashnii ochag, Penthouse, Liza, 
and a glut of other special-interest fare on furniture, 
cars, travel, videos, sports, computers, film, fashion,
5. By comparison with the 230 or so publishing houses that 
existed in the USSR, approximately 10,000 are now registered in 
Russia alone (Ivanov 17). Korobov bemoans the fact that the 
market is oversaturated, but only with "trash" (Korovbov 86).
6. Information obtained from Knizhnaia palata via telephone 
during August 1999 in Moscow.
7. In 1997 OLMA publishers brought out a volume of Tatyana 
Tolstaya's complete works in an edition of 15,000 copies, but this 
year an almost identical collection by Tolstaya appeared in a print 
run of 5,000. Yet when Tolstaya first debuted with 'Na zolotom 
kryl'tse sideli...' in 1987, the entire run of 65,000 copies sold out 
immediately.
8. It appeared in only 1000 copies.
9. Novyi mir's 1992 circulation of 2.75 million has fallen to
21,000 subscribers. Its editor, Sergei Zalygin, notes that in 1997 a
subscription cost 76,000 rubles, but with delivery leaped to
230,000 rubles—the equivalent of a monthly pension (Ivanov 18).
health, children, business, and so forth.10 While today's 
"great Russian writers" ("velikie russkie pisateli"), to 
invoke the Soviet cliche for gray eminences of the 
literary canon, live off foreign grants, overseas 
royalties, and a clutch of recently established, often 
controversial, awards,11 *as a salable commodity pulp 
fiction surpasses tampons, cigarette lighters, and 
pirozhki.
Victor Neuburg has defined popular literature 
elastically as "what the unsophisticated reader has 
chosen for pleasure" (12), but John Fiske, borrowing 
from Roland Barthes, has added precision to a similar 
definition without loss of flexibility. Fiske's 
formulation triangulates Barthes's useful distinction 
between readerly and writerly tendencies in texts and 
"the reading practices they invite" (Fiske 103). 
Whereas a readerly text is relatively closed and 
undemanding, and solicits an essentially "passive, 
receptive, disciplined reader who tends to accept its 
meanings as already made," a writerly text challenges 
the reader "constantly to rewrite it, make sense of it" in 
a construction of meaning. The first type of text 
therefore is popular, the second has only minority 
appeal—constituting what we might call Literature. 
The producerly text, in Fisk's perceptive synthesis, has
10. For a glance at these new glossies, see Viacheslav Kuritsyn, 
"Novye tolstye," and Goscilo, "S[t]imulating Chic." A key figure 
in the rise of glossies is the Dutchman Derk Sauer, with his partner 
Annemarie van Gaal, who introduced eighteen new, independent, 
private publications to post-Soviet Russia, including the papers 
Moscow Times (since Oct. 1992) and St. Petersburg Times (since 
April 1996); the magazines Cosmopolitan (since April 1994), 
whose circulation in four years has increased from 60,000 to 
400,000 per month; Kapital (since May 1995); Domashnii Ochag 
(since May 1995), which sells more than 300,000 per month; 
Playboy (since June 1995), which targets male readers 25-35 years 
of age and has a circulation of 140,000 per month; Russia Review 
(since 1995); Harper's Bazaar (since 1996); and, since December 
1997, Men's Health.
11. In addition to the formerly British-funded (and now Smirnoff- 
financed!) Booker Prize, which originated in 1992 and spawned 
the Anti-Booker (inaugurated in 1995 by the newspaper 
Nezavisimaia gazeta), there are the State Prize, the Pushkin Prize 
(dating from 1989 and funded by Germans), Triumph 
(administered through Zoia Boguslavskaia, and financed by the 
mogul Boris Berezovsky), the Apollon Grigor'ev Prize (awarded 
by the recently constituted ARSS [Akademiia Russkoi 
Sovremennoi Slovesnosti], orchestrated by Aleksandr 
Arkhangel'skii and underwritten by Uneximbank), and the 
$25,000 Solzhenitsyn Prize (announced in 1997), which draws on 
the royalties of $350,000 that annually accrue from the 
international publications of the writer's Gulag Archipelago. For 
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the accessibility of the readerly one, "and can 
theoretically be read in that easy way by those readers 
who are comfortably accommodated within the 
dominant ideology," but also possesses the openness of 
the writerly without requiring this writerly activity 
(104). Hence Fiske's insistence that analyzing popular 
texts requires a double focus (105) and his astute 
insight that "the combination of widespread 
consumption with widespread critical disapproval is a 
fairly certain sign that a cultural commodity or practice 
is popular" (106).12
Disposable, one-time narratives following 
established formulas for entertainment and steeped in 
values that subliminally appeal to the majority have 
taken Russia by storm. As might be expected, they 
have provoked indignant condemnation among 
"writerly" intelligentsia readers. That group's rejection 
of money-making ephemera springs partly from 
resentment at personal and social usurpation, partly
12. The category of producerly texts need not limit itself to 
literature. The pop'n'rock group Liube from the outset attracted 
me through its ironic, intertextual performativity, while both 
Liube's nationalist fans and its young detractors hear their lyrics as 
avowals of traditional Soviet allegiances. See Goscilo, "Record 
Raunch."
from condescending rejection of an alien, inadequately 
elitist, aesthetic. Pavel Basinskii's truculent protest 
against both the creation in 1998 of the Popular 
Literature Association (Assosiatsiia Massovoi 
Literatury) and the roundtable devoted to A. Marinina's 
prose symptomatizes the most conservative High 
Culture response to toppled deities and their 
replacements (Basinskii 10). At the other end of the 
critical spectrum is the issue of the New Literary 
Review (Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie) devoted 
primarily to popular literature (2 [1996]).13 Pace the 
maverick, Western-indebted New Literary Review, the 
majority of the Russian intelligentsia in the post-Soviet 
era views the commercial success of a book as its 
strongest indictment against literary quality (Dudovitz 
20).
State publishing houses such as Sovetskii pisatel’ 
have ceded to such enormous and enormously 
successful private conglomerates as Eksmo, which, 
with a staff of sixty to seventy, releases forty to seventy 
new titles per month. Eksmo handles a vast array of 
audience-targeted series: "The Black Cat" ("Chernaia 
koshka"—a line of original Russian detektivy, boeviki, 
and police novels established in 1994); "The Black 
Kitten" ("Chernyi kotenok"—an analogous line for 
children); and lines in war adventures, spy and crime 
novels, stories about the activities of Russian and 
foreign special forces, fantasy (ftntezi), historical 
novels, historical adventure, culinary books, illustrated 
children's works, historical romances, romances penned 
by such immortals as Danielle Steel and Justine Scott, 
as well as Russian originals, contemporary women's 
novels, and "Voice of the Heart" ("Golos serdtsa"), yet 
another series in women's fiction, recently inaugurated 
by translations of four Danielle Steel masterpieces 
(Knizhnoe obozrenie 3 [20 January 1998]: 25). The 
unabating proliferation of new lines has caused 
Aleksandr Voznesenskii, a savvy observer of 
publication patterns, to speak of Eksmo's "total 
diversification" and determination to. leave no 
bookselling possibilities unexplored ("Total'haia..." 5). 
As Eksmo's general director, Oleg Novikov, 
acknowledges, TV and newspaper advertisements, the 
facilitation of mail orders, and a packaging that ensures 
instant recognizability for each series have proved
13. The issue contains, inter alia, articles on pulp fiction in 
general (J.D. Gudkov), murder mysteries (Nataliia Zorkaia), the 




effective marketing strategies (Gnezdilova 6) borrowed 
from long-standing Western practice. Formation of 
book clubs, likewise masterminded by publishing series 
catering to readers' tastes, have also enhanced sales. 
Book covers and contents that adhere to the familiar 
tried and true seem to guarantee success.14 In short, 
Russian book business in the 1990s operates with 
different publishers, books, readers, and modes of 
distribution from those of the Soviet era.
Though genuinely popular fiction steadily 
infiltrated Russia during perestroika, the process 
accelerated sharply after the official demise of the 
Soviet regime.15 In the first flush of de-Sovietization, 
when the mania for all things Western knew no bounds, 
translations, chiefly from English and normally 
pirated,16 dominated the scene: Harold Robbins, Ken 
Follett, Stephen King, Sidney Sheldon, John Grisham, 
Michael Crichton, et al.
The watershed year of 1995, however, witnessed 
the onset of nostalgia and patriotism, which now grip 
the country.17 This retro-trend led to a measured 
reduction in translations and a commensurate increase 
in domestic page-turners, while the publication of
14. Aleksandr Voznesenskii notes, for instance, that the series 
"My XX Century" published by Vagrius, "Woman-Myth" 
("Zhenshchina-Mif"), and "Home Library of Poetry" 
("Domashniaia biblioteka poezii," also by Vagrius) all operate on 
the principle of instant recognizability and sell extremely well. 
Voznesenskii, "Garantirovannyi...," 1.
15. Translated sporadically during the Soviet era, Agatha Christie 
was a firm favorite, especially with the intelligentsia. So was Julia 
Chmielewska, the Polish writer whose "ironic detektivy" [sic] in 
Russian translation (as Khmelevskaia) are sufficiently popular 
today to periodically appear on bestseller lists. For a clear 
discussion of detektivy during the Soviet era and perestroika, see 
Nepomnyashchy.
16. The single most notorious case of copyright infraction 
involved Scarlett. While Khudozhestvennaia literatura was 
negotiating for legal rights to the media-hyped sequel, black 
marketeers peddled eight different illegal versions of the Russian 
translation (Ivanov 17; Lowe passim).
17. Symptoms of this nostalgia include the establishment of 
Russkoe Bistro, the sudden popularity of Russkoe Radio, the 
profound concern with the purity of the Russian language, Russian 
brands (e.g., of quality cigarettes, such as Petr pervyi and Zolotaia
iava; of butter, such as Derevenskoe maslo, advertised as a
national "bogatyr"' product), a search for the Russian national
idea, and so forth. For a summary of cultural phenomena 
evidencing the current retro movement, see Goscilo, "Record
Raunch...."
highbrow texts moved in the opposite direction.18 Not 
only favorite genres, but homegrown Russian authors 
now rule pulp.
"Detektivy"
The unchallenged champion among competing pulp 
genres today is the detektiv, which, contrary to John 
Cawelti's and Julian Symons's painstaking typological 
differentiation (among detective story, police novel, 
crime novel, and others), loosely encompasses murder 
mysteries, thrillers (alternatively called trillery'), and 
tales of crime.19 * *In 1996 detektivy, both original and 
translated, cornered thirty-eight percent of the entire 
market in Russian fiction (Ivanov 17) and at least one 
commentator contends that today the genre accounts for 
forty percent of all books published in Russia 
(Williams). The five best-selling authors of detektivy in 
1996 were, in descending order, Nikolai Leonov, 
Daniil Koretskii, Eduard Topol, Viktor Pronin, and 
Viktor Dotsenko. All five subscribe to the comic book 
philosophy of "a man's gotta do what he's gotta do" and 
its attendant implications. This gendered imperative 
reduces, in praxis, to repeated demonstrations of 
physical prowess (i.e., bedding women and pulverizing 
men), plus occasional flashes of extraordinary mental 
acumen, against a backdrop of violence, corruption, 
power games, shady business deals, sleazy nightclubs 
and strip joints, fast cars, guns, explosives, mobs and 
bodyguards, hookers and heels, gallons of spilled blood 
and semen—in short, everyday contemporary Russian 
life in the city. To differentiate among the high priests 
of this macho crime cult may challenge the neophyte, 
but a seasoned consumer easily distinguishes among 
them on the basis of style, emphases, and protagonists.
Eduard Topol, who emigrated to the United States 
in 1978, made his biggest splash with the international 
hit about Soviet corruption titled Red Square (Krasnaia 
ploshchad’, 1983), and, more recently, with China Lane 
(Kitaiskii proezd, 1997), a thriller touted as the Russian
18. The number of English-language bookstores stocked with 
"respectable" texts increased in Moscow throughout the 1990s. 
Aleksandr Ivanov, the editor of the small but successful publishing 
house Ad Marginem, which specializes in translations of Western 
theory, is co-owner with the American academic Mary Duncan of 
Shakespeare and Co., an anglophone bookstore that, with the aid 
of Gias editor Natasha Perova, until 1999 orchestrated discussions 
in English of recent publications for expatriates residing in 
Moscow.




Covers of male-authored detektivy: Nikolai Leonov’s Foul Cop, Leonid Slovkin’s When They're Shooting at Us, and Viktor Dotsenko’s 
Beshenyi’s Return.
Primary Colors?® Transposed to a "mythical" China, 
this roman a clef about Russia's 1996 presidential 
election exposes the collusion of money and corruption 
in politics. In lurid technicolor Topol1 traces the 
Byzantine campaign machinations of "corrupt mob-tied 
government officials and political advisers, ruthless 
Russian and American businessmen" (Stanley) and 
such transparently masked characters as President Yel 
Tsin, his daughter Tan Yel (Tat'iana D'iachenko), the 
Communist candidate Zyu Gan, Prime Minister Cher 
Myr Din, the millionaire Boris Bere of Beria Bank, and 
so forth. Topol's prose evokes writing by numbers 
keyed to a black-and-white moral code accessible to the 
average eight-year-old. Seduced by its deluge of 
scandalous revelations, Russian readers lapped it up as 
one might savor a particularly juicy morsel of 
kompromat21 or gossip about the famous that has it 
both ways: it voyeuristically titillates, yet leaves one
20. In June 1994 Topol's signally titled Kikelover (Liubozhid, Elita 
Pub.) occupied the #10 slot on the bestseller list.
21. Compromising material. This genre has acquired such 
widespread popularity that the Marat Gel'man Gallery devoted an 
entire exhibit to the art of kompromat.
feeling (presumably, like the author) morally superior.22 
The book placed #2 in the bestseller charts during May 
of 1997.
Topol's most recent publication takes a detour of 
sorts, into the crime-related area of sex-service. The 
New Russia in Bed, on the Beat, and in Love (Novaia 
Rossiia v posteli, na pan'eli i v liubvi, 1999),23 *subtitled 
Sex During the Transition from Communism to 
Capitalism (Seks pri perekhode ot kommunizma k 
kapitalizmu), claims to be a "documentary-belletristic 
novel in three parts and two interludes" 
("dokumental'no-khudozhestvennyi roman v trekh 
chastiakh i dvukh antraktakh"). With undisguised 
relish Topol interviews the madam of a whorehouse, 
sex-workers in night clubs, and random representatives
22. The barrage of scandal sheets and gossipy items in the post- 
Soviet press attests to Russians' appetite for sensationalist 
reporting, especially about "big names." Polina Dashkova, one of 
the latest in a series of successful female authors of "detektivy," 
has added her voice to the chorus complaining about post-Soviet 
Russia's passion for yellow journalism (see "Moia mama ubila 
Ivana!").
23. The twenty thousand paperback copies comprising the first
non-hardcover edition of this edifying work were printed, 
improbably enough, by the Moscow publishing company ACT.
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of the New Russia who participated in the Sauna 
Seminars Topol arranged as a venue for swapping 
personal stories about sexual experiences. In this 
catalogue of others' self-revelations, Topol 
subordinates illegality to illicitness as he interrogates 
the perpetrators of sexual acts that might shock or 
disgust the fastidious reader, but would leave a devotee 
of MTV unstirred.
In contrast to Topol, who prefers non-committal 
geographical titles, Nikolai Leonov opts for 
melodramatic ones to hook the thrill-seeking reader: 
Narco-Mafia (Narkomafiia, 1994), Hired Killer 
(Naemnyi ubiitsa), Scarlet Blood (Krov' alaia—#4, 
then #2 bestseller in January 1994), No Hold Barred 
(Bespredel, which leaped from #10 to #3 in December 
1997), and Egyptian Vultures (Sterviatniki, #7 in 
December 1997, but moving to #2 in January 1998). By 
early 1995 Leonov had sold 1,360,000 copies of 
twenty-one editions and ranked third in the list of top­
selling writers for 1994 (Stakhov 54).24
An old hand at the crime genre, which he has 
practiced for approximately a quarter-century, Leonov, 
born in 1933, has a law degree and ten years of 
professional police experience. The "Black Cat" series 
recently issued his Complete Works in fifteen volumes. 
His novels regularly feature the protagonist Lev Gurov, 
a sophisticated police colonel of impeccable integrity 
and fashion sense—described by Leonov's publishers 
as "charming, paradoxical, clever, and intrepid" 
("obaiatel'nyi, paradoksal'nyi, umnyi i 
besstrashnyi")—who battles organized crime, whether 
via penetration into a computer data bank {Foul Cop 
[Ment poganyi}) or by protecting a millionaire banker's 
drug-addicted daughter in the midst of a planned 
presidential assassination {Jackals [Shakaly]). Leonov 
interfuses his narratives with topical issues (New 
Russians, drug peddling, political elections, the war in 
Chechnia [Gurov's DefensefZashchita Gurova]) and 
anchors crime in the drive for money and power. 
Rather than wallowing in slow-motion depiction of 
seediness or sexual congress, he often privileges mind 
over muscle, spotlighting the methodical 
professionalism and thought processes of his stalwart 
protagonist. By avoiding facile shock effects, purple 
patches, and mythological aggrandizement of
24. The two top niches were occupied by authors of Russian 
"historical novels": Valentin Pikul' (2,325,000 copies and 24 
editions) and Dmitrii Balashov (1,620,000 copies and 14 editions) 
(Stakhov 54).
stereotypical macho routines, Leonov achieves a kind 
of reassuring stolidity in his mysteries that may 
ultimately disappoint and bore fans of the genre's "wild 
side."
The disenchanted would find ample compensation 
in Viktor Dotsenko's action-packed series of adventures 
about Afghan war veteran Savelii Beshenyi (Rabid), 
the Russian Rambo. His Beshenyi's Return 
(Vozvrashchenie Beshenogo) ranked #1 among January 
1995 hardcover bestsellers, as did his Beshenyi’s Hunt 
(Okhota Beshenogo) in hardcover sales for January 
1998.25 By early 1996 Dotsenko had sold 2 1/2 million 
books and the following year Vagrius issued his 
Complete Works in seven volumes (Shevelev 68). 
Clearly an aficionado of the picaresque mode, 
Dotsenko strings together incidents that showcase his 
hero's unparalleled command of the martial arts, his 
fluent English, and his sex appeal. These assets are 
tethered to what Dotsenko fondly believes is a form of 
Eastern mysticism that propounds discipline and moral 
purity in the midst of carnage. Accordingly, as 
Beshenyi (also known, regally, as Rex) sends men 
flying through the air and crashing to the pavement, he 
mentally engages in "lofty metaphysical" debates with 
his Master, the weightiness of whose dicta Dotsenko 
signals via the artless device of non-stop capitalization.
The crudest and most hapless of the detektivy gurus, 
Dotsenko (who spent three weeks as a journalist in 
Afghanistan [Shevelev 68]) alternates pages of 
"profound philosophical dialogues" and cliche-studded 
ruminations on deplorable changes in the New Russia 
with set sequences of random violence and unwittingly 
hilarious descriptions of supposedly daring sex (woman 
on top, fellatio in public, group sex, deflowering of 
[Asian] minors), all couched in a stunningly 
impoverished vocabulary.26 *According to Dotsenko, he 
dislikes Russian Literature, can write one of his 
"novels" in approximately two months, and finds his
25. According to the cover of the pocketbook edition of 
Vozvrashchenie Beshenogo (Vagrius, 1996), by 1996 Dotsenko's 
series had sold 3,500,000 copies. These included Srokdlia 
Beshenogo, Komanda Beshenogo, Mest' Beshenogo, Zoloto 
Beshenogo, and Nagrada Beshenogo. By mid-1997 Dotsenko's 
total sales exceeded 5 million copies of seven novels (Stanley). 
During January 1998 his latest Beshenyi saga climbed from 
second to top place in hardcover fiction (Knizhnoe obozrenie [6 
July 1998: 7] [20 January 1998: 7]).




six-year-old son's love for Beshenyi flattering.27 His 
prose testifies to the veracity of these claims. Indeed, 
the magnitude of Dotsenko's pretensions is at such odds 
with his scant verbal resources that his prose constantly 
verges on camp, hence appealing to six-year-old adults.
In the first thirty-five pages of Beshenyi's Return,
Lesha-Shkaf, the boss of a Moscow mafia mob, wins 
the heart and other bodily parts of Lolita (aka Ilona), a 
leggy twenty-year-old beauty from the Harlequin 
nightclub,. by finding and enabling her to wreak 
vengeance on her rapist. Using the fabled Bobbitt 
technique, Lolita deprives the marauder of his 
"weapon": "she seized his member... and abruptly cut 
it with the knife" ("ona ukhvatila ego za chlen ... i 
rezko chirknula po nemu nozhom," 27). After 
witnessing this decapitation, the suitably impressed 
Leshka quickly couples with her,28 gives her clothes, 
money and a bodyguard, and orders the organless 
rapist's death. Theirs, obviously, is a true love match, a 
"real man's" version of a Harlequin romance.
M
acho heroics and lip-smacking sleaze 
suffered a blow in 1997, with the meteoric 
rise of Aleksandra Marinina, who has 
outpaced her male counterparts, to become the ruling 
queen of detektivy.19 A lieutenant colonel of police at 
the Moscow Law Institute in the MVD (Ministry of 
Interior) until her resignation in February 1998,30 the 
now 42-year-old Marina Alekseeva qua Marinina made 
her solo debut in the genre with the murder mystery 
Combination of Circumstances (Stechenie obsto-
27. Such, at least, was the case in 1996 (Shevelev 68).
28. In the inadvertently comic description of this "heave and toss" 
interlude, as in others, "moshchnaia grud1" and "plot"' become 
leitmotifs (see 28 and passim).
29. During three weeks in August 1997 and again in January 1998, 
each time I rode the metro (from two to six times daily), at least 
one person in the traincar and often as many as three were 
engrossed in one of Marinina's works (either in paperback, at 
approximately $ 1 each, or in hardcover, which on average cost 
$2.75). In 1996 Dotsenko held third place among best-selling 
authors, with 740,000 [hardcover?] copies of books published; 
Marinina trailed behind him in fifth place with 525,000 copies 
(Moscow Times [30 November 1996]: 21). By the end of 1997, 
however, Marinina had gained the position of premier writer in the 
category of hardcover fiction (Moscow Times [10 January 1998: 
15).
30. According to some sources (e.g., Daniel Williams), Marinina 
retired in March 1998, but in fact she received official 
confirmation of her resignation a month earlier.
iatel'stv) in 1993.31 Her output since then totals twenty- 
one novels, which have sold over 15 million copies.32 
She topped the charts in hardcover sales for 1997, and 
during that year granted what must be a record number 
of interviews to journalists intrigued by a woman's 
unprecedented success in a heavily masculinized genre. 
Eksmo/"Black Cat" published her Complete Works 
(subsequently rendered incomplete by her recent 
mysteries); in the first half of 1998 she reportedly 
signed a $2 million contract with Henry Holt publishers 
and Owl Books, as well as with Argon Verlag and 
Fischer Verlag in Germany and with publishers in 
France, Spain, Italy, China, Sweden, Latvia, Japan, and 
Korea (Azhgikhina; Williams). Currently in production 
at NTV is a sixteen-part TV mini-series titled 
"Ramenskaia," based on eight of Marinina's novels, 
starring the quasi-nubile Elena Iakovleva of 
Interdevochka fame as Marinina's detective heroine, 
Anastasiia Ramenskaia.33 In short, Marinina has 
attained cult status, and, predictably, was featured as 
one of three women among Russia's top twenty-five 
personalities in the inaugural issue of the slick People 
magazine clone, Cult of Personalities (Kul't lichnostei, 
May/June 1998). In fact, she verges on becoming a 
mainstay of publications addicted to featuring the best- 
known "names" in the country, who, as Andy Warhol 
might say, are known for being known.34
Misdubbed the Russian Agatha Christie (and 
accused by detractors of aping Western models 
[Karsanova 12]), Marinina focuses on moral dilemmas 
and especially the psychological aspects of criminality. 
Analysis and revelatory background material on 
characters therefore abound in her mysteries, of which 
human relationships, obsessive passions, and love ties 
form the thematic and structural backbone. The Illusion
31. She had been writing since 1991. For more information about 
her earlier efforts, see Williams and the Marinina web site at 
<www.marinina.ru>, as well as Nepomnyashchy.
32. The twenty-one titles, in alphabetical order, are: Chernyi 
spisok, Cluizhaia maska, la umer vchera, Igra na chuzhom pole, 
Illiuziia grekha, Imia poterpevshego: Nikto, Muzhskie igry, Ne 
meshaite palachu, Posmertnyi obraz, Prizrak muzyki, Rekviem, 
Sed'maia zhertva, Shesterki umiraiut pervymi, Smert' i nemnogo 
liubvi, Smert' radi smerti, Stechenie obstoiatel'stv, Stilist, Svetlyi 
lik smerti, Ubiitsa ponevole, Ukradennyi son, and Za vse nado 
platit1.
33. The series will be shown by the end of 1999 or in the 
beginning of 2000, when videos of the serial will go on sale. See 
Voznesenskii, ''Total'naia...," 5.
34. The other two were the fabledly ageless pop singer Alla 
Pugacheva and Yeltsin's daughter, Tat'iana D'iachenko.
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of Sin (Illiuziia grekha), Death's Radiant Face (Svetlyi 
lik smerti), Everything Has a Price (Za vse nado 
platit'), Death for Death's Sake (Smert' radi smerti), 
The Stylist (Stilist), and most of her other narratives 
consistently reveal Marinina's distrust of unmonitored 
medical and scientific experimentation and professional 
privilege, her preoccupation with justice, and, above 
all, her attachment to intelligentsia values.
The linchpin in Marinina's novels is her alter-ego 
protagonist, the lieutenant colonel of police Anastasiia 
(Nastia) Ramenskaia, whose chief assets as an 
investigator are a superb memory and brilliant logical 
analysis, buttressed by computer expertise. A 
workaholic obsessed with solving crime, Ramenskaia 
in several key respects incarnates feminist principles 
(professional dedication, superior reasoning skills, and 
indifference to marriage, domesticity, and her own 
physical allure), and without mounting soapboxes 
dispassionately dissects the misogynistic essentialist 
assumptions underlying conventional Russian thought 
and structuring Russian society.35 Ironically, enervated 
sexist formulas are the resort of Marinina's major 
publisher, Eksmo, which advertises Ramenskaia as a 
"vulnerable and beautiful woman" ("khrupkaia i 
krasivaia zhenshchina"), despite Marinina's 
determination to counter such gendered banalities by 
spotlighting her protagonist's brains and 
professionalism.
Invariably set in contemporary Moscow, Marinina's 
novels focus not on "who," but on "why"—on the 
psychological motivation behind crimes and on the 
complex personal and professional dynamics among 
members of Ramenskaia's team of investigators. These 
dynamics recall such American TV shows as “NYPD,” 
and the evolution of relationships between individuals 
within this relatively stable set of characters constitutes 
part of each novel's appeal.36 Eschewing the gore,
35. See Marinina's comments on feminism in the interview with 
Azhgikhina; Goscilo, "Feminist Pulp Fiction"; and Marinina's Igra 
na chuzhom pole (188-93) and Muzhskie igry (228, 293). As 
Klein sensibly maintains, "[w]hereas radical or socialist feminism 
demands sweeping social re-creation, liberal and revisionist 
feminism suggest that although the current, patriarchal 
organization of society is flawed, women should work through 
existing systems to effect change and to expand women's 
opportunities" (200). The moderate feminism of Ramenskaia and 
her author is piecemeal and intermittent, operating within the 
parameters of a changing but established system.
36. Nepomnyashchy's contention that Ramenskaia tends to be
rescued by her "protective male collective" (174) ignores the fact
that all core members of that collective react "protectively" when
Queen of Fictional Crime: Aleksandra Marinina
relentless physical brutality, and graphic sex scenes that 
proliferate in Dotsenko’s tales, she integrates current 
social issues and post-Soviet phenomena (e.g., New 
Russians, mafia, sexual permissiveness) into crime 
detection in such diverse milieux as research institutes, 
film studios, publishing houses, hospitals, and so on.
A unique element in Marinina's prose is the 
frequency of meta-commentary; various of her 
characters' penchant for gauging people by their choice 
of reading matter allows her to pass implicit judgment 
on other contemporary writers. For instance, an 
educated female character in Marinina's The Small Fry 
Die First (Shesterki umiraiut pervymi) waxes 
incredulously indignant when her lover mentions 
Topol': "'What, you're reading Topol’? But I 
forbade you to read his books. They're cheap trash, 
faddish slime and porn'" ("'Ty chto, Topolia chitaesh'? 
[...] Ia zhe zapretila tebe chitat' ego knigi. Eto 
deshevka, eto kon"iunkturnaia chernukha-pornukha'" 
[29-30]). In the same novel, that lover questions a 
woman's maturity because he finds Dean Roontz37 *
danger threatens one of them, irrespective of gender.
37. Why Roontz, the best-selling author of Dragon Tears, 
Phantoms, The Mask, The Servants of Twilight, Dark Rivers of the 
Heart, and more than twenty additional thrillers, strikes Marinina
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among such presumably more acceptable authors on 
her shelf as Sidney Sheldon and Jackie Collins (!): "He 
himself didn't read Koontz, and only knew that it was 
mysticism, fantasy, and other such horrors, but his 
thirteen-year-old son was hooked on those books" 
("Sam on Kuintza ne chital, znal tol'ko, chto eto 
mistika, fantastika, i prochaia 'zhut',' no knigami etimi 
zachityvalsia ego trinadtsatiletnii syn" [179]). The 
absence of romances among the selections, however, 
reassures him. Marinina's narratively mediated enmity 
to romances and sci-fi seems to confirm W.H. Auden's 
disputable generalization that "the detective story [...] 
makes its greatest appeal precisely to those classes of 
people who are most immune to other forms of 
daydream literature" (Auden 157).38
Unlike in the West, detektivy in Russia attract 
predominantly male readers (Hoffman) and, until 
recently, exclusively male authors (men reportedly 
comprise seventy percent of mystery readers, though 
the same percentage of all Russian readership is female 
[Landsberg]).39 Women consuming this tradionally 
gendered genre largely confine themselves to Marinina 
and the swelling contingent of successful female 
practitioners of the genre, many of whom build their 
narratives around romance.
Tat'iana Poliakova's short, breezy narratives, now 
regularly found on the bestseller list, revolve around 
first-person female protagonists who at work's end bask 
not only in facile solutions but also in the passionate 
avowals of the dashing romantic heroes they
conveniently encounter along their bullet-strewn way.40 
Marital discord or alienation is a staple of Poliakova's 
prose, which smacks of a "tough girl" mentality (e.g., 
The Cruel World of Men [Zhestokii mir muzhchin, 
1998]). Marinina's pale reflection Polina Dashkova—a 
graduate of Moscow's Literary Institute and 
pseudonymous author of six detektivy that over two 
years sold more than half a million copies ["Moia 
mama"])—varies her protagonists with each novel, 
tackles contemporary events and issues, and strives for 
a refined style, which teeters on blandness. Both she 
and Marinina avoid not only scenes of prolonged 
violence,41 but also explicit detailing of sexual activity 
and the kind of euphemized yet crude sexual servicing 
that Dotsenko in particular savors, mating soft-porn 
hymns to harmony via hymens with unadorned factual 
reporting of, for instance, a witless moll masturbating 
to climax with a banana while giving a mob boss head 
(Beshenyi's Return 426).42
The genre of detektivy has proved a veritable boon 
for Russian women authors,43 *its remarkably successful 
representatives including not only Marinina, Dashkova, 
and Poliakova, but also Elena Iakovleva, Natal'ia 
Kornilova, Anna Malysheva, Viktoriia Platova, Marina 
Serova. By and large, their works (and especially 
Marinina's) corroborate the hypothesis that female 
authors of crime fiction are "at the forefront of pulling 
[... this] fiction away from the predictable and towards 
a more psychological and social exploration of crime" 
(Coward and Semple 54). Exceptions are writers like 
Irina L'vova, whose series of pseudo-deteUzvy about 
the two sisters Rita and Stella (!) uses the pair's 
involvement in crime among the rich and mafioso’ed as
as inferior to Collins and Sheldon defies all conjecture. Eksmo has 
released translations of Koontz's major works in the "Kholodnyi 
ogon'" line (Edinstvennyi vyzhivshii, Ocharovannyi krov'iu,
Gibloe mesto, Molniia, all in 1997).
38. My operating assumption here—confirmed by interviews with 
her—is that Marinina reads detective fiction, as well as authoring 
it.
39. In striking contrast to England, where the most skillful and 
renowned contemporary authors of murder mysteries have been 
women (Christie, Sayers, Rendell, James), Soviet Russia published 
only male crime fiction, centered on official police investigation 
rather than the clever sleuthing of private detectives—a 
circumstance directly related to the empiric absence of private eyes 
under the socialist regime. Furthermore, crime fiction in Russia 
lacked the enormous readership it enjoyed and continues to enjoy 
in the West, as was implicitly recognized in Symons' remark that 
crime literature during the 1970s was "almost certainly more 
widely read than any other class of fiction in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and many other countries not under Communist 
rule" (17, emphasis added).
40. Poliakova's Sharp Cookie (Tonkaia shtuckha) placed #2 in the 
paperback bestseller list for January 1998.
41. Poliakova does not flinch from violence, but attempts to gain 
distance from it through a forced lightness, a kind of "tough girl" 
humor that seems intended to display sophistication.
42. Dotsenko's limp renditions of sexual activity tirelessly invoke 
the same lexicon: "vozbuzhdennaia plot'," "kamennaia plot'," 
"zhazhduiushchee veshchestvo" for erection, "iziashchnaia 
popochka" [203-204], "bezvol'naia plot'," "otverdevshaia plot'," 
"nizhnie gubki" [425, 257-58, 426]). The elimination of the word 
"plot"' from the Russian language would plunge Dotsenko's purple 
passion prose into crisis.
43. Female authors of detektivy, unlike their male counterparts, 
have a penchant for articulating gender differences that imply or
explicitly refer to questionable aspects of men's behavior, to which 
their titles advert (e.g., Marinina's Muzhskie igry, Poliakova's 
Zhestokii mir muzhchin [1998], Malysheva's Moi muzh—man'iak? 
[1998], Platova's Kukolka dlia monstra [1999]).
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Covers of female-authored detektivy: Aleksandra Marinina’s 
Death's Bright Face, Marinina’s Everything Has a Price, Tat’iana 
Poliakova’s Sharp Cookie, and Marinina’s Stolen Sleep.
a transparent excuse for drooling over la dolce vita: 
anorexic on plot and wholly indifferent to structure, the 
unforgettably titled Stella Tempts Fate (Stella iskushaet 
sud’bu, 1999), Stella Makes a Choice (Stella delaet 
vybor, 1999), and Stella Cheats Death (Stella 
obmanyvaet smert’, 1999) amply display a "material 
girl's" appreciation of fabulous furs, jewels, exotic 
foods, yachts, luxury apartments, the world’s hot spots, 
and men's eternal devotion (Azhgikhina, "Sladkaia 
zhizn'," 6). Stunningly vulgar in their obsessive 
consumerism and juvenile in their notion of what 
makes for a "cool" heroine,44 these extraordinary 
narratives evoke a dimestore female James Bond whose 
conception, as one astute critic contends, seems to 
spring from a psychological problem that this writing 
apparently alleviates ("Sladkaia zhizn"'). In her reliance 
on authoring as psychotherapy, L'vova most blatantly 
resembles Dotsenko and, to a lesser degree, Topol.
What explains the current supremacy of the detektiv 
as a genre? First, the widespread criminalization of 
Russian society that accompanied the lurch to a market
44. For a sharp glance at the newly-emerged superwoman in 
today's pulp fiction, see Azhgikhina, "Supersledovatel' i 
superagent," 6.
economy renders the detektiv a narrative of everyday 
life (bytopisanie) often indistinguishable from 
newspaper accounts of daily shootouts and murders 
that leave the police confounded.45 John Cawelti 
contends that formulaic literature affirms "existing 
interests and attitudes by presenting an imaginary world 
that is aligned" with them, resolves "tensions and 
ambiguities resulting from the conficting interests of 
different groups within the culture," and assists the 
"process of assimilating changes to traditional 
imaginative constructs" (35-36). However 
simplistically, detektivy partially reflect contemporary 
reality, but simultaneously reassure readers, for on their 
pages crimes tend to be solved and their perpetrators 
apprehended and punished.46 Second, the hyperbolic 
derring-do of cardboard heroes feeds male fantasies, 
thereby serving a compensatory function at a time when 
impotence, alcoholism, and an average life expectancy 
of fifty-eight years blight the image of Russian virility. 
Third, the detektiv is the sole pulp fiction genre 
tolerated by the intelligentsia, which comprises a 
sizable percentage of Russia's readership.47 Although 
intelligenty criticize the stylistic flaws and linguistic 
solecisms of individual authors, both the potential for 
cerebral analysis in detektivy (which, mutatis mutandis, 
minors the literary critic's task) and the Formalist 
engagement with the genre lend it a touch of 
respectability even among hardcore intellectuals, who 
may occasionally slum without losing face or incurring 
a mental hangover.48
That especially obtains in the case of Marinina, 
whom intelligenty generally deem a cut above her male 
competitors, though at least one critic has singled her
45. Among the rash of unsolved murders of public figures in 
politics, media, and business, those that have generated the 
greatest speculation are the deaths of the American businessman 
Tatum, the Ostankino journalist List’ev, the "mastermind" behind 
the new macho magazine Medved', and the much admired 
anthropologist/politician Galina Starovoitova. For a brief survey 
of current detective fiction, with conclusions that partly coincide 
with mine, see Nepomnyashchy and Borden.
46. Within the framework of Auden's scheme, this process entails 
the restoration of a state of grace.
47. The intelligentsia finds science fiction acceptable only if it has 
elevated pretensions, such as the Strugatsky brothers', and thus 
may be subsumed under Literature.
48. See the article by Viktor Shklovskii titled "Novella tain," 
devoted primarily to Arthur Conan Doyle's series of Sherlock 
Holmes mysteries, which analogizes the popular genre's device of 
building suspense through retardation with techniques favored by 
E.T.A. Hoffmann and Charles Dickens, as well as Dostoevsky.
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out as an exceptionally dreadful writer (Karsanova 12). 
One could, in fact, argue that numerous specific 
references in her work to elitist cultural forms (e.g., 
Japanese literature [Sfy/Er], Mozart's music, operas and 
international operatic singers such as Caruso, Caballe, 
Carreras, and Domingo [Posthumous Image/ 
Posmertnyi obraz 42-43]) betray her pretensions to 
"transcending" the limitations of pulp fiction.49 Yet, 
perhaps paradoxically, in one of her best-known novels 
she embeds a defense of pop culture genres as a means 
of inculcating ethical values. When a murder suspect 
dismisses a TV serial as nonsense, his wife retorts, 
"Well, of course, it's not high art, no one's arguing that. 
But such films teach people how to act right in 
situations that are complicated from a moral and ethical 
point of view. They teach a simple truth: if you love 
someone, don't consider your beloved worse or stupider 
than youself" ("Eto, konechno zhe, ne vysokoe 
iskusstvo, kto sporit. No takie fil'my uchat liudei, kak 
pravil'no postupat' v slozhnykh s moral'no-eticheskoi 
tochki zreniia situatsiiakh. Oni uchat prostoi istine: esli 
liubish', ne schitai svoego liubimogo khuzhe ili glupee 
sebia" [Combination of Circumstances (Stechenie 
obstoiatel'stv 218)]).
Russian detektivy, then, show more variation than 
one might suppose on the basis of their uniformly 
tawdry, single-style covers. And the readership, 
likewise, encompasses diverse classes and levels of 
education.
Sci-fi and Mysticism
Second in popularity after detektivy in 1996 was the 
peculiarly double-barreled category of "science fiction 
and mysticism," accounting for twenty-six percent of 
all fiction sales that year (Ivanov 18). The fantasy that 
produces these narratives is inseparable from the 
irrationalism and faith in mysterious forces that 
characterize Russia in the 1990s. This retro trend 
ranges from a revival of religious Orthodoxy, 
rediscovery of Madame Blavatsky, Rudolf Steiner, and 
Nikolai Roerich, republication of dozens of related 
sources, the infiltration of the occult into literary texts 
by Zufar Gareev, Aleksandr Borodynia, Marina Palei, 
Mark Kharitonov, and Aleksandr Vernikov (Brougher, 
passim), and the fad for sundry strands of Eastern 
thought (witness the "philosophical" flirtations of Boris
Grebenshchikov, Viktor Pelevin, Dotsenko), to the 
craze for astrology, hypnosis, tarot cards, dream 
interpretation, homeopathic medicine, pseudo-scientific 
treatises, and, in rural areas, the manifestation of pagan 
superstitions.50
Last year in the remote village of Valiuki within
Ubiquity of Crime: “The Gangster Style Comes to Moscow,” the 
verbal text of an ad for sophisticated male fashion wear, 
reproduced in various glossy magazines.
Russia's farming community, for instance, two men 
wielding hammers, who had consulted a local spiritual 
faith-healer experienced in warding off the "evil eye," 
burst into a woman's hut and proceeded to kill her 
mother and injure her and her siblings because they 
were convinced that she had placed a curse on them 
(Beeston). Similar witch hunts have been reported 
elsewhere, often abetted by proclaimed mystics and 
soothsayers credited with supernatural, magical 
powers. This atmosphere of visions and voodoo partly 
explains the prominence of Mikhail Andreev and Pavel 
Globa. Andreev is president of the Association of 
White Magicians and host of the NTV weekly program
49. According to a recent article in Vanity Fair, Marinina harbors
a fondness for opera libretti.
50. Indeed, in 1996, religion and the occult led the market in non­
fiction, accounting for twenty-six percent of all sales. "How-to" 




“Third Eye” (“Tretii glaz”), which conducts 
enlightening interviews with witches and wizards and 
counsels viewers on effective sorcery. An astrologer 
and author of thirty books, Globa hosts his own 
paronomastically titled TV show, Global Advice, 
claims that astrology is scientific and mathematical, and 
advises celebrities and State Duma deputies, who 
presumably make decisions on the basis of his 
predictions (Allen). Until 1996, General Georgii 
Rogozin headed a team of Kremlin staff astrologers 
whose sole job was to aid Yeltsin in his policy-making 
(Spector). Nancy Reagan, in short, has more in 
common with the Russian administration than she ever 
suspected.
An ineradicable belief in occult forces has 
propelled into the spotlight such people as Liliana 
Filonova, star of the show Help Me, Liliana (Pomogi 
mne, Liliana),5' who for more than three years has 
operated the First All-Russian Academy of Practical 
Magic and Hypnosis [sic]. This dubious institution 
schedules courses in techniques of hypnosis and 
seances empowering one to combat the evil eye, 
alcoholism, tobacco dependency, allergies, excessive 
aggression, fatigue, failure in business and trade, 
difficult family relations, weak will, excess weight, and 
specifically female dilemmas (Strength of Spirit [Sila 
dukha]).52 Her illustrated brochure advertises Filonova 
as a psychotherapist, pedagogue, and magician (mag), 
and dispenses sage counsel that would chill the blood 
of any transvestite or shopper at used-clothes outlets: 
"Never wear someone else's clothes. They can 
influence your fate. It's very dangerous" ("Nikogda ne 
odevaite chuzhuiu odezhdu. Ona mozhet povliiat' na 
vashu sud'bu. Eto ochen' opasno"). She and others 
purportedly blessed with ESP speak in the Russian 
equivalent of America's psycho-babble, and their huge 
followings testify to Russians' incessantly invoked 
penchant for the irrational or fantastic. The continuity 
between this quotidian (often pragmatic) quasi­
spirituality, on the one hand, and attraction to genres 
grounded in fantasy, on the other, is self-evident.
Although males predominate among readers and 
authors of science fiction, the prolific Mariia 
Semenova, a computer specialist with a higher 
education, has caused a minor sensation with such
51. The show is broadcast on two channels, 3 and 61.
52. For more personalities who have acquired fame through the 
fad for things occult, see "TV 666."
works as Wolfhound CVolkodav [1995]), which sold 
more than 250,000 copies in a year. Semenova leaves 
few fantasy and sci-fi paradigms unturned, writing of 
werewolves ("Hunter" ["Okhotnik"], "Darling"), time 
travel (Sign of the Elect [Znak izbrannika]), 
extraterrestrial conflict (Iern Wolves [Iemskie volki]),53 
and, in Wolfhound, whose eponymous superhero 
improbably combines Viking warriors with Conan the 
Barbarian, timeless tribal warfare.54 Alla Latynina's 
daughter, Iuliia Latynina, when not penning articles on 
political economics for sundry papers or trying her 
hand at detektivy,55 also turns out fantastic stories of 
essentially moral conflicts set in temporally and 
geographically imaginary realms, not unlike the 
Strugatsky brothers' narratives, which continue being 
reprinted. Translations of Asimov, Bradbury, Clarke, 
C.S. Lewis, Tolkien, and their like, which initially 
captured public imagination, have been partially 
replaced by a steady outpouring of domestic narratives 
in which borders between fantasy and sci-fi typically 
blur.
Cycles figure substantially in the area of fantasy, 
with the line "Zvezdnyi labirint" ("Astral Labyrinth") 
publishing Sergei Luk'ianenko's Stars Are Cold Toys 
(Zvezdy—kholodnye igrushki) and The Earth Is 
Paradise (Zemlia—eto rai) and Ol'ga Larionovna's 
Kreg's Gospel (Evangelie ot Krega), the latest in her 
cycle, which began with Chakra Kentavra and Della 
Uella (Kur'er SF). Technical breakthroughs and the 
universal preoccupation with virtual reality have 
incubated an updated, computer-inspired version of 
fantasy, exampled in such fundamentally dissimilar 
novels as Boris Shtern's Ethiopian (Efiop [1997]), 
Mikhail Uspenskii's Time It (Vremia Ono [1997]), and 
Iulii Burkin, and Konstantin Fadeev's Fragments of 
Heaven, or The Real Story of the Beatles (Oskolki 
neba, Hi Podlinnaia istoriia "Bitlz” [1997]).56 The 
reliance of this and other pulp fiction genres on readers'
53. These stories, novel, and novella are collected in her 400-page 
anthology Znak izbrannika (Eksmo, 1997), issued in the 
"Absoliutnoe oruzhie" line.
54. Like Dotsenko, Semenova also resorts to the artless device of 
capitalizing "significant" passages.
55. Although a fine analyst of Russia's current economic situation, 
in The Hunt for Iziubr' (Okhota na Iziubria, 1999) Latynina overly 
displays her professional expertise in financial matters, writing an 
unutterably dull pseudo-rfcfekriv glutted with endless 
conversations about financial schemes and woefully lacking the 
suspense and above all fast action so prized by Dotsenko.
56. For a survey of this tendency, see Baskakov.
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addictive impulses or loyalty to a given series or 
persona accounts for the proliferation of cycles and 
series, which in a sense parallel TV serials.
Beneath the ostensible diversity in this category 
lurks a soporific sameness. The majority of forays into 
fantasy, whether scientific or "free style," suffer from 
not only a dearth of genuine inventiveness but also a 
debilitating dependency on primitively conceived moral 
conflicts articulated with pompous verbal flatulence. 
Balanced uneasily between pretension and musty 
entertainment formulas, this category would benefit 
from following the genuinely extravagant, credulity- 
defying flights of imagination fueling, for example, the 
everyday behavior and pronouncements of Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky and Eduard Limonov.
Romances, or Eternal Love,
Western Style
Romances came third in the pulp pantheon of 1996, 
comprising seventeen percent of the market (Ivanov 
18), but since then have surged ahead to compete for 
second place, catering to a huge, exclusively female, 
audience. Russians have dubbed these gendered 
fantasies "love burgers," for they bear the stigma/ta of 
fast-food production. Ranging from contemporary love 
stories to pseudo-historical narratives and bodice 
rippers, they are churned out by the thousands 
according to a single, basic recipe susceptible to limited 
variations. Marinina, with characteristic down-to- 
earthness, registers contemptuous bewilderment at 
women's insatiable enthusiasm for the sob, throb, and 
live-happily-ever-after format, and ventriloquizes her 
alienation from it through a male character in one of 
her detektivy,57 who reads romances to fathom the 
fabled mystery of the "female mind" and deconstructs 
the genre paradigm as
dreams of an unearthly love with a gorgeous 
millionaire-prince who must have dark hair 
and blue eyes, a firm mouth, and a masculine 
chin.... In these romances [...] the man with 
the blue eyes and masculine chin behaves 
cruelly toward the girl, who suspects nothing; 
he either ignores her or ridicules her, or does 
something else from which one may deduce 
that he has negative feelings toward her. Later
57. Marinina's animus against this wholly feminized genre crops 
up in several of her works. See also Muzhskie igry.
it suddenly transpires that he loves her madly; 
she, naturally, also loves him, and they start 
making love, in the course of which the man 
with blue eyes busies himself for a long time 
with his partner's breasts and nipples, which 
gives the female author the chance to enjoy a 
detailed description of this refined occupation 
for a page and a half or two.
mechty o nezemnoi liubvi s prekrasnym 
printsem-millionerom, u kotorogo obiazatel’no 
temnye volosy i sinie glaza, tverdyi rot i 
muzhestvennyi podborodok... [V] etikh 
romanakh [...] muzhchina s sinimi glazami i 
muzhestvennym podborodkom vedet sebia 
zhestoko po otnosheniiu k nichego ne 
podozrevaiushchei devushke, libo ignoriruet 
ee, libo izdevaetsia, libo eshche chto-nibud', iz 
chego mozhno sdelat' vyvod, chto on plokho 
k nei otnositsia. Potom vdrug okazyvaetsia, 
chto on ee bezumno liubit, ona, estestvenno, 
ego tozhe liubit, oni nachinaiut zanimat'sia 
liubov'iu, i pri etom muzhchina s sinimi 
glazami dolgo i nudno zanimaetsia grud'iu i 
soskami svoei partnershi, davaia 
vozmozhnost' pisatel'nitse naslazhdat'sia 
detal’nym opisaniem etogo izyskannogo 
zaniatiia stranitsy na poltory-dve.
(Shesterki umiraiut pervymi 179-80)
Clearly, elaborate foreplay does not figure among 
Marinina's enthusiasms. The accuracy of her 
formulation aside,58 romances in the Western sense 
were thoroughly alien to Soviet readers. And, in fact, 
today the foremost stars in the genre are foreign authors 
in translation, led by Barbara Cartland, nicknamed 
Baba Katia by the salesmen on Kuznetskii Most, a 
prime venue for mobile bookpeddlers (Ivanov 18).59 
The near-total identification of romances with overseas 
provenance has prompted the few Russian authors.
58. Although Harlequins are insistently formulaic, the physical 
appearance of the hero varies much more than Marinina 
recognizes, and the foreplay that she finds so puzzling and tedious 
has become de rigueur only in the last decade or so.
59. Bibliopolis in St. Petersburg, which in 1994 released Pushkin's 
Collected Works in five volumes, publishes Cartland's frothy 
pseudo-historical fantasies, as well as the incomparably better 
written, witty Regency romances of Georgette Heyer.
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assaying the genre to adopt Western pseudonyms so as 
to certify the authenticity of their page-turners.
The premier purveyor of romances in Russia is the 
pioneering publisher Harlequin. In 1992 Harlequin 
implemented its standard ploy for gauging sales 
potential by testing the waters with translations of six 
rather tame, older selections from its Harlequin 
Romance series, printed by its Russian partner, Raduga 
Press, in a run of 100,000 copies each to launch the 
"liubovnyi roman" line.60 By December 1997, more 
than 160 Harlequin paperbacks had been translated and 
tagged numerically within the series, as vypusk 1, 2, 
etc. (Hoffman).61 This undifferentiated numbers 
approach, which evokes assembly-line production, 
reached absurd heights in mid-1999. Acclaimed as the 
premier best-selling series of 1998, with a total run 
approximating 70 million copies, Raduga/Harlequin in 
the July press release announcing its 300th vypusk 
offered a prize for the lucky reader in possession of all 
previous 299 titles. In tacit acknowledgement of the 
generic nature of these page-turners, it did not bother to 
mention, however, author or title of its "milestone" 
vypusk (Voznesenskii, "Garantirovannyi..." 1).
Although visually Harlequin covers fully 
correspond to their anglophone originals, sales charts 
refer to Harlequins not as Arlekiny, but as "liubovnyi 
roman." Strictly speaking, it and the less successful 
"iskushenie" (Harlequin Temptation) are lines within 
the series, against which compete "panorama romanov 
o liubvi" and "seriia romanov o liubvi," which have 
brought the palpitating amorous insights of Virginia 
Holt, Carole Mortimer, Emilie Loring, and Mary 
Burchell to eager Russian fans. In contrast to the low- 
key, virgin-obsessed narratives that ushered in the 
genre (Janet Dailey, Betty Neels, and Emma Darcy), 
the latest offerings draw on more recent, racier 
Harlequins, which extend the boundaries into the
60. Inside the paperback cover of la vse snesu (a translation of 
Janet Dailey's No Quarter Asked [1974]), the publisher blatantly 
finetunes the blurb to Russian specifications: “V romane 
zalozheno sil'noe dukhovnoe, zhizneutverzhdaiushchee nachalo, 
eto gimn bol'shomu, instinnomu chuvstvu, dobrote, vole k zhizni."
Two of the other four pioneering Harlequins released in Russia 
that year were Emma Darcy's Pattern of Deceit (translated as 
Zhenshchina v serom kostiume) and Anne Mather's The Judas 
Trap (Lovushka ludy).
61. Before the economic meltdown of August 1998 Harlequin
paperbacks cost 60 to 70 cents, depending on the store or kiosk. 
Since then, that price has not significantly altered.
markedly more heated realms of soft pom (Susan 
Napier, Charlotte Lamb).
Whereas in the United States authors of Harlequins
(e.g., Janet Dailey, Penny Jordan) had to break out into 
the larger arena of novels before making the New York 
Times Book Review bestseller list, in Russia, Harlequin 
romances themselves can actually confer that status: in 
the first month of 1998, both Betty Neels's Beatrice's 
Marriage and Jessica Steele's With His Ring were 
included in the top ten, as Zamuzhestvo Beatris and 
Brilliantovoe kol'tso, respectively. And in September of 
1995 romances accounted for half of the top ten 
paperback bestsellers.
T
oday romances occupy entire walls of such 
thriving bookstores as Biblio-Globus, off the 
Lubianka, and Molodaia Gvardiia, on Bol'shaia 
Polianka. Given Russian women's seemingly 
unquenchable thirst for these tireless reworkings of the 
Cinderella plot, what explains Russians' inability to pen 
domestic versions, which leaves this lucrative segment 
of the book market in Western hands? Several factors 
account for the lacuna. First, Russia lacks a love-story 
tradition as a foundation to build on. Crime narratives 
comprised a solid part of Soviet mass literature, as 
evidenced by the popularity of the Vainer brothers and 
Iulian Semenov. Thus for such veterans of detektivy as 
Leonov and Leonid Slovkin,62 with twenty-plus years 
in the genre's trenches, the contemporary variant of the 
form merely calls for an adjustment to current tastes 
and possibilities. Nothing even remotely resembling 
Western romances existed during the Soviet era, which 
makes the genre a genuine, exotic newcomer to the 
Russian cultural scene. Second, the very discourse of 
romance is alien to conventions of Soviet Russian 
fiction: for decades one passionately—and
purely—loved Lenin, Stalin, the Komsomol, the Party, 
and one's Motherland, but not a private individual of 
the opposite sex to the virtual exclusion of everything 
and everyone else. Consequently, a convincing Russian 
equivalent for the language of impassioned declarations 
and euphemized periphrasis for consumerism and 
sexuality that are endemic to Western romances has yet 
to be forged. Moreover, as at least one Russian 
commentator has cogently argued, today's Russia lacks 
a real-life model that could be hyperbolized into the
62. Slovkin is the Jack Webb of detektivy, giving "the facts, 
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The Heart Is Increasingly Where the Body May Be Bared: 
Translations of Romances, from the early Roberta Leigh and 
Emma Darcy narratives (top), to the soft-port, pectoral passions 
exposed by J. Merritt and A. Major (bottom).
masculine ideal of the Romantic hero crucial to the 
genre:
According to Western tradition, he must be, 
first of all, sexual (consequently, a 
southerner), and, secondly, rich. If we try to 
translate these indisputable virtues into our 
native equivalents, then the best we can come 
up with is a New Russian, and, moreover, 
ethnically speaking, probably from the 
Caucasus. Such a hero certainly isn't going to 
appeal to all of our women readers. And, in 
general, how would we depict the "ideal 
world" [of romances] in which one wants to 
believe, and make it credible?
Po zapadnoi traditsii on dolzhen byt1, vo- 
pervykh, seksualen (stalo byt1, iuzhanin), a vo- 
vtorykh, bogat. Pri popytke perevesti eti 
nesomnennye dostoinstva na "iazyk rodnykh 
osin" vykhodit v luchshem sluchae "novyi 
russkii", k tomu zhe naverniaka etnicheskii 
kavkazets. Ne vsiakoi nashei chitatel'nitse 
takoi geroi pridetsia po dushe. [...] Da i kakim
voobshche dolzhen byt' tot "ideal'nyi mir", v 
kotoryi mozhno i khochetsia verit'? 
(Fal'kovskii 5)
While the improbable synthesis of sexual 
irresistibility, physical perfection, economic power, and 
peerless sophistication personified in the maximally 
virile hero of romance likewise has no counterpart in 
Western "real life," the socio-economic instability in 
Russia makes this composite fantasy figure not only 
absurd but ethnically and morally problematic. As a 
group, affluent Russian businessmen have a reputation 
for treating women as exchangeable and disposable 
goods. Few are the individuals capable of extravagant 
romantic gestures betokening their monogamous 
passion for "the one and only woman"—and, moreover, 
one they marry. The attention accorded a wealthy 
businessman's public gesture when he plastered the 
message "I love you" to his ex-model wife on 
numerous Moscow billboards featuring her face in 
close-up indicates the exceptional nature of such 
avowals in the Russian context. And the brutality and 
instrumentalization that underpin relations between the 
two sexes in general hardly conduce to Cinderella or 
Romeo and Juliet scenarios.63 If detektivy provide 
psychological compensation for embattled manhood, 
romances fulfill the same function for overburdened, 
disillusioned women—or, as an advertisement in The 
Book Review dated 7 February 1995 promises, "novels 
about love help to distract one from daily cares and to 
have a psychological rest [literally, rest for one's soul]" 
("romany o liubvi pomogaiut otvlech'sia ot 
povsednevnykh zabot i otdokhnut' dushoi," Knizhnoe 
obozrenie 6 [7 Feb. 1995]: 9). The foreign origins of 
romances, however, imply that both "eternal love" and 
economic security may be attained only outside Russia. 
In that sense the remoteness and hyperbole of the 
romantic universe analogize the genre with science 
fiction and fantasy.
Pulp Paradise and Literature Lost
As this highly condensed and partial survey 
indicates, book business in Russia is booming. Such 
mainstream stores as Dom knigi, Molodaia gvardiia, 
Biblio-Globus, and the colossal bookmarket at the
63. A recent screen treatment of the deathless Cinderella plot, 
Villen Novak's Printsessa na bobakh (Princess on a Hill of Beans, 
1997), cast a New Russian in the unlikely role of prince. For the 
prevalence of the Cinderella story in Russian film, see Stishova.
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Olympic Stadium carry everything from Bibles, chic art 
books, and esoteric scholarly tomes to anthologies of 
anekdoty, anglophone rock magazines, and manuals on 
make-up, exercise, and bee-keeping. Moreover, 
virtually every underground passageway and metro 
station boasts at least one book stall (lotok) loaded with 
pulp fiction in both hardcover and paperback.
As a cultural form that during Soviet times 
absorbed philosophy and political commentary to an 
extraordinary degree and constituted the pride and joy 
of Russia's intelligentsia, upper-case Literature, 
however, has tumbled from its pedestal. Such 
bookstores as 19-oe oktiabria, U Sytina, and Eidos, 
which purveyed exclusively High Culture texts, have 
closed, and Gileia, which likewise caters solely to 
refined, minority tastes, has experienced financial 
difficulties that have necessitated relocation to a rather 
obscure spot off the Ring Road and that eventually may 
prove insuperable.64
Partly to compensate for the lack of a supportive 
infrastructure and an acquisitive, broad-based 
readership, the primarily photo-op genre of 
presentations still flourishes, and literary prizes 
proliferate. These publicized symbolic rituals, however, 
cannot disguise the dispiriting fact that subscriptions to 
literary journals have dwindled, runs of texts have 
drastically shrunk, and countless writers are 
moonlighting in the sphere of popular culture: for 
instance, Irina Polianskaia writes romances under a 
pseudonym, and Larisa Vasil'eva has abandoned poetry 
altogether to pen semi-scandalous biographies. Even 
comparatively successful authors, such as Mark 
Kharitonov, Valeriia Narbikova, Marina Palei, 
Vladimir Sorokin, and Liudmila Ulitskaia, rely 
financially on foreign contracts and subsidies, as well 
as residencies abroad. At the International Moscow 
Book Fair in mid-1997, former literary idols (e.g., 
Valentin Rasputin) attracted a sparse crowd of admirers 
(Zolotov). And the once sanctified Solzhenitsyn 
resembles an ambulatory anachronism, less relevant 
than Stalin to current cultural activities.65
It makes financial sense, then, that popular culture 
has started seeping into the formerly inviolable temple 
of Literature. Currently, the favorite genre is the
memoir—as evidenced by recent volumes authored by 
Bella Akhmadulina, Andrei Bitov, Andrei 
Voznesensky, El'dar Riazanov, and a plethora of lesser 
names—and the related genre of biography (those of 
Lazar Kaganovich, Brigitte Bardot, and a host of 
homegrown entertainers, most notably Alla Pugacheva, 
whose two-volume lifestory was one of the two top 
bestsellers of 1997).66 One may partially ascribe the 
public's enthusiasm for these genres to the media's 
influence on tastes in various spheres and to the 
perennial fascination with "the rich and famous." Not 
unlike America's Entertainment channel, Voznesensky's 
thick volume of reminiscences titled In a Virtual Wind 
(Na virtual'nom vetru, Vagrius, 1998) allots a chapter 
each to the author’s meetings with celebrities: Picasso, 
Solzhenitsyn, Lili Brik, Vysotsky, Pasternak, Aleksandr 
Kerensky, Sartre, Henry Moore, and Bob Dylan. The 
innumerable photographs show a self-satisfied 
Voznesensky being famous alongside even more 
famous personalities. Vitalii Amurskii's Recorded 
Voices (Zapechatlennye golosa, 1998) consists of 
conversations with celebrated Russian authors, 
including Joseph Brodsky, Bulat Okudzhava, and 
Bitov. The journalist Sergei Romanov's Tales of... 
(Baikipro..., 1998) integrates his short sketches into a 
contemporary memoir of Moscow and its inhabitants 
(Zakharov, 1998). Such projects border on expansions 
of items one encounters in People.
Not accidently, the reigning stars in "intellectual" 
creative prose today are the two Viktors—Pelevin and 
Yerofeyev, whose works show receptivity to popular 
currents. Whereas Yerofeyev's fiction (Russian Beauty 
[Russkaia krasavitsa], Final Judgment [Strashnyi 
sud\) usually explores existential dilemmas in a self­
consciously erotic mode calculated to shock, his recent 
book, Muzhchiny (1997), offers a socio-philosophical 
meditation on Russian malehood and its identity. 
Yerofeyev concludes that Russian males, historically 
mired in falsehood and drinking, have mutated into 
pseudo-men with a paralyzed will and a complete, 
absence of the aggression that Yerofeyev deems men's 
defining trait (Selivanova). Like virtually all of 
Yerofeyev's works, Muzhchiny sparked impassioned 
controversy, the first edition quickly selling out, with a 
second one following in 1998. Yerofeyev's rather 
jejune and willfully myopic lament for the loss of
64. By contrast. Grafoman and Ad Marginem seem to suffer no 
fiscal stress.
65. That holds true for his writings but not, of course, for the
literary prize he has underwritten, for money speaks more 
eloquently than words in post-Soviet Russia.
66. The other was the memoirs of A. Korzhakov, Yeltsin's 




macho quintessence illuminates in part the success of 
pulp fiction, which typically restores hyperbolic virility 
to its fantasy protagonists. The dust jacket of his latest 
publication, Five Rivers (Piat' rek, 1999), captures the 
peripatetic, "spiritual" Yerofeyev in a "native garb" 
vaguely redolent of Eastern mysticism—a photo-op 
identity that allies him not only with Richard Gere, but 
also with Pelevin and the most successful of Russia's 
answers to Paul McCartney, Boris Grebenshchikov 
(known to the faithful as simply BG).
This fledgling symbiosis between popular forms 
and High Culture in post-Soviet Russia likewise 
expresses itself in Pelevin's fiction, specifically in the 
saliency of computers, games, and a pseudo-Buddhist 
mysticism to the worldview inscribed in his texts. Yet, 
as Pelevin's possibly sincere interview with Sally Laird 
reveals,67 his unabashed foraging in pop culture should 
not be misconstrued as a strategic crossover to the 
"trashy writers" of pulp fiction. Like most authors of 
both pulp and High Literature, Pelevin perceives 
himself as uniquely outside the mainstream (Laird 185) 
and above the coarse buck-chasing agendas of pop 
gurus.
The relative popularity of individual writers such as 
Yerofeyev and Pelevin notwithstanding, ultimately, 
Russia's open cultural market has demoted Literature to 
the status of pulp fiction's poor cousin. For better or 
worse, the patterns in Russian reading mirror those in 
the U.S.: a miniscule percentage of the 
population—and, moreover, that segment whose 
purchasing capacity has eroded dramatically—invests 
in texts conceived and perceived as immortal 
contributions to the treasure trove of World Literature. 
The vast majority's seemingly unappeasable hunger for 
page-turners, by contrast, guarantees huge sales and 
substantial returns for those hawking what one may 
finally call genuine mass literature in Russia. Whatever 
the shambles of post-Soviet Russia's economy and 
politics, vox populi calls the shots in the production and 
sales of fiction. Ironically, what traditionally has 
carried the stigma of chtivo ("pulp" or "trash") now 
qualifies as that rare phenomenon in the new Russia—a 
genuine instance of democracy in a society riven by old 
habits of political privilege and new capacities for 
arbitrary empowerment through wealth. During the 
tumultuous 1990s, pulp fiction authentically reflects
67. Rightly or wrongly, Pelevin has a reputation for playing games 
not only in malls and arcades, but also with interviewers.
"the people's choice" among the "most readerly nation 
in the world."
Helena Goscilo, Professor of Slavic Languages at The 
University of Pittsburgh, is the author of "The 
Explosive World of Tatyana N. Tolstaya’s Fiction" 
(M.E. Sharpe, 1996) and co-editor and translator, with 
Beth Holmgren, of Anastasya Verbitskaya’s "Keys to 
Happiness” (Indiana University Press, 1999).
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NO(W)STALGIA
RETRO ON THE (POST-)SOVIET TELEVISION SCREEN
Natalya Ivanova
D
uring that time when the post-Brezhnev period 
(subsequently inaccurately called the period of 
“stagnation”) was still fading away, Georgian 
and Abkhazian prose writers, poets and critics, along 
with their Russian, Ukrainian, Estonian, Kazakh (the 
list could be continued) colleagues, all in all 30 people, 
no more, would gather together every year on the 
blessed Kolkhid shore at the invitation of the Main 
Editorial board on Translation and Cooperation among 
Literatures of the Georgian Council of Ministers and 
the editorial board of the journal Literary Georgia 
{Literatumaia Gruziia). “In this remote province by the 
sea” you could talk much more freely than in the 
imperial center: the tone and spirit were more than 
unofficial. The topics of the seminars were devoted to 
different aspects of Georgian literature. Pavlo Movchan 
and Vadim Skuratovsky came from Kyiv, Aksel Taum 
from Kazakhstan, Levon Mkrtchian from Yerevan, Ilya 
Dadashidze from Baku, Oleg Chukhontsev, Andrei 
Bitov, Alla Latynina and Alla Marchenko, Bulat 
Okudzhava, Vladimir Lakshin from Moscow, 
Algimantas Buchis, the author of several books on 
Lithuanian and “Soviet multinational” literature, came 
from Lithuania...
The last seminar took place in 1986.
I recently learned that Algis Buchis gathered up his
books in his Vilnius home and committed a quarter­
century of his life and work to flames. He burned 
everything except two slim collections of poetry and 
prose, which he still considered worthy to live on.
Everyone is parting with his past in different 
ways—if he chooses to do so—the painful reminders 
of which are at times inescapable. On the day after 
Bulat Okudzhava’s funeral, Nedelia published an 
installment of its “Portrait Gallery,” in which Boris 
Zhutkovsky recalls the meeting with Leonid Ilichev, the 
head of the Central Committee’s ideological 
commission. I quote the “summary notes”: E. Belyutin, 
“The sense of civic responsibility has weakened”; B.
Akhmadulina, “We detected the Party’s anxiety”; Y. 
Yevtushenko, “We are all for the Revolution.”1 That’s 
how it was. That’s how people thought. And that’s how 
they maneuvered. Or, that’s how they defended their 
own understanding of the reality: “I understand that 
there is no ‘us’ vs. ‘them.’ That generally everybody is 
‘us,’ and the more that I come into contact with people 
around me, the more and more I am convinced that 
everybody is ‘us,’ with a greater or fewer number of 
sins, virtues and faults” (Bulat Okudzhava’s speech, as 
recorded by B. Zhutkovsky).
Yevgeny Yevtushenko began his new life and new 
professional career as a teacher in the United States. 
Others from his generation and circle resiliently moved 
into their post-Soviet present without external shocks 
and remote crossings.
For example, Lenin Prize laureate Yegor Isayev 
busies himself with poultry farming at his dacha in 
Peredelkino. Another proudly brandishes his services 
to democracy with the aid of the particle “not”: did not 
belong, did not take part, did not sign. Somebody 
engages in frenzied overthrowing, while somebody 
else, on the contrary, arrives at the necessity for a 
painstaking analysis of his “past self,” what Yury 
Trifonov in his novel, Time and Place, called an 
“operation on oneself.”
Meanwhile, those who were born in those “remote 
years,” and who now actively operate in the Russian 
cultural scene, choose not so much—and not only—a 
repudiation of the near and distant Soviet past, but on 
the contrary, paradoxically search for their contact with 
it. For different reasons. And in different ways. I will 
now address these reasons, ways and contacts.
1. Nedelia, no. 22 (1997).
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RETRO BECOMES ONE OF THE 
LEADING FORMS
“An epidemic of nostalgia,” in Andrei Razbash’s 
opinion (Chas pik, June 16, 1997).
The newspaper Izvestiya (no. 81, 1997) prints two 
cheerful photographs of Muscovites (1959), taken by 
the American William Klein. An exhibit of Klein’s 
work, organized by the energetic Olga Sviblova, is 
enjoying great success in the “Moscow-1997" 
exhibition in the Pushkin Museum’s Private 
Collections. Gennady Khazanov acknowledges that “in 
the countries of the former Soviet Union a very large 
number of people come to my concerts [to relive] their 
youth.”2 Sergey Zhenovach mounts Alexander 
Volodin’s Five Evenings at the Malaya Bronnaya 
Theater. The reviewer of this production writes about 
the “nostalgia for the radiant in the socialist past, 
which unites today’s Communists with the more 
democratically oriented sectors of Russian society.” 3 
Let me remind you that Volodin’s play is rather 
dramatic; it concerns the difficulties of returning to 
reality encountered by a person who has been away (an 
Aesopian hint—the reason is clear) several years, and 
it’s about loneliness. Today’s production, however, is 
about something completely different: “The play, it 
turns out, concealed a considerable psychotherapeutic 
effect [...] You leave the theater with a strange, almost 
forgotten sense of conciliation,” notes Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta. But that is precisely the effect of retro, an 
effect of gratifying “nostalgia for the radiant.” The 
same issue of Nezavisimaya Gazeta prints a lengthy 
interview with Yevgeny Matveyev (“People’s Artist of 
the USSR”) who relishes recalling with that same 
“nostalgia for the radiant” the all-union premiere of the 
movie A Particularly Important Task (1981): “All 
kidding aside, I’m proud of that movie! It’s good, it’s 
about courage, about people’s spiritual strength”; he 
recalls with satisfaction playing the role of Brezhnev: 
“...Leonid Ilich in the movie Soldiers of Freedom is 
quite the fellow—a robust, young general who loves 
women and drink”; he joyfully recalls his propaganda 
jaunts around the country: “I traveled so much on 
behalf of the Propaganda Bureau and gave readings!
2. G. Khazanov, “I did not have and am not having an affair with 
the authorities,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, June 18, 1997.
3. G. Zaslavsky, “Feelings and Reason,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta,
April 30, 1997.
Tvardovsky was in my repertoire, and Sholokhov and 
Gorky...” 4 Some might take exception that the 
nostalgia of people’s artist of the USSR Yevgeny 
Matveev is understandable and is merely a 
compensatory mechanism. Then I will add to these 
solid testimonies made by such solid figures the voice 
of a young poet:
More beautiful than early rising 
And the festive fireworks in the cities,
Which do not grow dim with consciousness,
That belief in absolutes has been shaken.
And outside the window an inscription darting by, 
Though it praised the creators of lawlessness,
It fit so nicely into the embankment,
Like famous titles on the spines of books.
—A. Sharapova, Novyi mir, no. 1 (1995)
“Nostalgia for the radiant” informs the mood and 
tonality of contemporary art, in particular poetry:
the yardwoman exits the entryway
the factory worked noiselessly
there under the stairway—downstairs
the ugly mug was dissolving her retard in a basin
always in a kerchief and wearing a winter hat
stoking the smoky furnace with a crowbar
the children were shouting upstairs
the smell of the morgue and the road
the strong smell of moonshine
—G. Sapgir, Novyi mir, no. 2 (1997)
Until the worst day, until the time of the grave 
in this wretched and colorless fatherland 
you have borne your cross, and other worlds 
you did not even dream of while you were alive.
Because you saw your fate approaching 
in the forms of decay—
a posthumous native land in a black paradise— 
you have been granted the dream of atonement.
—Igor Melamed, Novyi mir, no. 2 (1997)
And yet, despite the expressive and harsh 
judgments and even curses at the past (not for nothing 
does Sapgir preface the cycle of his poems with the 
line: “Let Babylon flare up with fire” and Melamid call 
paradise “black”), nostalgia moves on the offensive. 
And it makes good use of government officials who 
pay lip service to letting art take care of itself, but who 
in reality thrust their own mediocre nostalgic aesthetic 
tastes on the entire population. The Mayor of Moscow 
gives the artist Shilov, a talentless epigone of the
4. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, March 6, 1997.
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socialist realist Laktionov, a luxurious mansion in the 
city center to serve as a private museum, while 
President Yeltsin gives his blessing not only to the 
exhibit but to the entire Ilya Glazunov “academy.”
T
elevision has now become the most important 
art form Television has driven the fine arts off 
onto the shoulder, having won over millions of 
movie goers and hundreds of thousands of readers of 
the thick journals. The degree of influence and 
authority can be measured by the battle over ownership, 
the 1996 presidential campaign, the ill-fated box full of 
dollars... There’s plenty of indicators by which to 
measure. And it’s precisely on TV that “nostalgia for 
the radiant” past has become one of the genre­
determining principles.
Television has responded extraordinarily keenly to 
the public’s state of mind and, it must be admitted, has 
known how to manipulate and direct the public’s mood 
with the help of Mexican, Latin American, and simply 
American soap operas. Television has won over an 
enormous number of former readers to the absolutely 
unbelievable, part fairytale for the post-Soviet viewer, 
virtual reality. We know of instances where mothers in 
maternity wards have named their newborns after 
heroes and heroines in TV serials; the magnificence of 
the Russian visit by Veronica Castro, the leading 
actress in the serial “Maria” and “Simply Maria," an 
actress of little world renown, to put it bluntly, eclipsed 
the degree of illumination accorded to important state 
visits. Milkmaids in collective farms would not go out 
to their sobbing cows on account of an inconvenient 
time slot, which finally had to be rectified according to 
their demands; in Crimea mass disturbances were noted 
when the Russian television broadcasts of the 
American soap “Santa Barbara” were stopped; viewers 
in Ukraine protested the new dubbing of that same 
“Santa Barbara”—the characters spoke in Ukrainian 
instead of Russian.
In addition to “Santa Barbara,” the five channels of 
Russian television broadcast a baker’s dozen of soap 
operas, most of them Latin American in origin, and 
only one homegrown product, the serial “Strawberries,” 
which plunges the viewer into an imaginary post-Soviet 
market reality: artists who achieved their fame in the 
Soviet era perform simple reprises from the lives of the 
owners and customers of a fledgling cafe. Of course, 
the ratings for the television serials outstrip the ratings 
for all other programs, and it is no coincidence that the
new private RenTV, which had declared itself at the 
outset to be “television with the face of an intelligent, ” 
broadcasts seven television serials throughout the day 
to win their audience share.
Apart from the soaps, the largest audience share 
goes to game shows and talk shows, cloned from 
popular Western models: “Field of Wonders,” “Name 
That Tune,” “What? Where? When?” “L-Club,” “One 
Hundred Against One” (games); “I, Myself,” “We,” 
“Profession,” “Dog Show.”
It is only recently that two essentially new projects 
have made their appearance on TV. Both are Russian 
productions without clear analogues in Western TV 
production: “The Old Apartment” (RTR) and “Our 
Time: 1961-1981” (NTV). (“The Old Apartment” is 
broadcast monthly, “Our Era” is a weekly show.)
The programs share a similar mission—the artistic 
documentary investigation and recreation of the 
cultural, political, and historical topics from a given 
year (“Old Apartment” began with 1946, “Our Era” 
with 1961.)
The very genesis of these programs is partly owing 
to what might be called the crisis of the cultural and 
historical identity of the former Soviet society. Both 
projects begin their historical countdown from a time 
with which many of today’s viewers have an immediate 
connection (memory and fate). The programs are 
conceived and realized by people who are sensitive to 
the shift in cultural and historical styles: the dramatist 
Viktor Slavkin and directory Grigory Gurvich (“Old 
Apartment”) and journalist Leonid Parfenov (“Our 
Era”).
Both programs made their appearance when 
Russian post-Soviet art and literature had passed 
through two periods.
The first period, the period of conceptualism, was 
thoroughly engaged with the deconstruction of the Big 
Style of the Soviet period, namely, the parodic and 
travestying utilization and lowering of its component 
elements. (For example, the poetry of Dmitry Prigov, 
the early Timur Kibirov (before 1991) and Bakhyt 
Kenjeev, as well as the prose of Yegveny Popov, 
Vladimir Sorokin and Viktor Pelevin.)
Not only the “heroes” of the Soviet era were 
subjected to this travestying crowning-uncrowning. 
Consider Prigov’s Militsianer, Pelevin’s cosmonauts 
and Alexei Maresev (Omon Ra), the Party leaders in 
Yevgeny Popov (The Soul of a Patriot), the Komsomol 
enthusiasts in Sorokin (Four Stout Hearts), the 
military in Kibirov (Toilets), Kenjeev’s government
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officials (Chernenko), but the image itself and the style 
of the Soviet era are depicted as rotting, decaying and 
stinking (hence the surfeit of fecal and anal imagery; 
the prose writer Valery Popov in his novella The Days 
of the Harem dubs its adepts the “fecalists.)
The direction of the artistic quests of the entire 
conceptualist company reveals a kinship to the archaic, 
an appeal to the deep layers of the collective 
unconscious. Consequently, in Kenjeev’s poemas an 
archaic ritual lament (“conclamare”)is parodically 
reborn, for example, buzhen’e, the basic element of 
ritual laments. “The lament’s song,” notes Olga 
Freidenberg, “at first in keeping with the disappearance 
of the totem, subsequently becomes a lamentation for 
the deceased and is sung to the accompaniment of 
protracted, plaintive music; among the Etruscans and 
Romans this is a song, an elegy with the Greeks. These 
laments, which contain the names and deeds of the 
deceased, are transformed into slava (glory) and khvala 
(praise), where a short exposition of his deeds and 
merits is given.” In “Militsianer,” Prigov’s character 
becomes the name and deity of official Soviet society. 
The ceremonial description of his acts, and his 
“glorification” turn into the uncrowning of the totem of 
power. One can easily locate the archaism and the 
buffoonery (of Greek rites, the festival of the ritual 
sacrifice of the sacred bull) in Pelevin, who links the 
general ideological and sacrificial quality of Soviet 
astronautics with the forced amputation of limbs, while 
the Soviet cosmos itself is the Moscow subway system.
Leaving behind Greco-Roman rites for those of 
contemporary Russia, one can say with confidence that 
conceptualist prose and poetry was performing 
kostroma—the festival of preparation, offering of 
hymns and then the burning and drowning of the Soviet 
scarecrow. (Incidentally, any revolution, including a 
cultural revolution, without fail appeals to the archaic 
layers of consciousness, as can be witnessed by the 
reverse side of the cloth of conceptualism from the 
opposing, Soviet side: recall the burning of 
Yevtushenko in effigy in the yard of the Union of 
Writers on Povarskaya Street.
The next stage in the development of literature 
after conceptualism (which includes those same authors 
and those same actors of contemporary Russian letters) 
has already been designated as the “new sincerity” and 
the “new sentimentalism.” Based on the nostalgic 
return to literature of a lost emotionality, new 
sentimentalism opposes (frequently within the bounds 
of one and the same authorial persona) conceptualism,
which to a large extent had exhausted the pathos of 
mocking Soviet cliches and stereotypes, a 
conceptualism that was ossifying, dying, gasping its 
last breath, losing its fury and topical vitality, its ardor 
dissipating. And then came the period of Bakhyt 
Kenjeev’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Timur 
Kibirov’s Paraphrasis and Viktor Pelevin’s Chapaev 
and Pustota—ancient theater in reverse order: first 
dramatic satire and then tragedy. Or rather, not tragedy 
but elegy: a song about that which had passed, free of 
any mockery and ridicule. Take, for example, 
Kenjeev’s incredibly sympathetic Uncle Xenofont, “in 
whose work predominated the motifs of aestheticism 
and bourgeois humanism, the uncle of the narrator who 
is recalling his youth: “He was wearing a coarse tunic 
pulled on over a shirt, holding a lyre, which for some 
reason he had tucked under his arm, and in his hand a 
plain pine wreath with a single sprig of laurel. [...] 
Behind Xenofont a banner stretched across the entire 
podium with the slogan: ‘With a lyre in our hands we 
will build the world.’ Below, like captions on vacation 
photographs, a calligraphic inscription announced: 
‘The Second Congress of Soviet Esosterics, Moscow, 
1936.’”5
This nostalgic and elegaic intonation (ranging from 
Kibirov’s poetry to the unavoidable announcements we 
have today on the subway, reminding the riders of the 
special cultural significance of the Moscow Metro) are 
diametrically opposed to the aggressive nostalgia of the 
political sort that are given expression in Stalinist 
posters and slogans or the unwillingness to part with 
Lenin’s body. (V. Ampilov explained on the news 
[NTV, July 5] that since Lenin’s body is situated lower 
than ground level, and Stolypin buried Lermontov in a 
burial vault with a window, the question of the 
Christian aspects of Lenin’s burial is settled once and 
for all.)
C
ultural nostalgia, while resuscitating cliches 
and stereotypes, at the same time keeps them at 
a distance while it constructs its own subjects 
out of these same cliches and stereotypes.
That’s precisely how “The Old Apartment” was 
planned and executed. Members of the talk-show 
audience, primarily comprised of people who have seen 
something of life, so as not to say elderly, are invited 
onto the stage by the host. The stage is set with objects
5. Oktiabr', no. 1, (1995).
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of a certain era and the invited participants become the 
characters (the principle of a living, working museum) 
of a certain story which they tell with the help of the 
prompting audience. The collective time machine 
begins its work. The audience remembers, joins in 
singing songs, argues (sometimes among themselves) 
while enumerating specifics about the events, they 
recite poetry, get confused, bring out statistics and 
garble facts. The audience is simultaneously a chorus, 
the collective participant and collective interpreter, 
creator of the myth, part of the myth and the one who 
lays bare the myth; it is the living past and 
simultaneously the judge of that past. From the picture 
of an individual human fate one is supposed to divine 
the fate of the country—and vice versa. The lively, 
spontaneous reminiscing out loud of a bygone time by 
completely different people, united only as “neighbors 
in time,” to use Yury Trifonov’s expression; for 
example, a housewife and a teacher; Irina Bugrimova, 
the tiger tamer; composer Vladlen Davydov and the 
author of the national anthem, Sergei Mikhalkov; the 
writers Daniil Danin and Alexander Borshchagovsky. 
Their reminiscences, which touch upon the most 
diverse topics of a given year, ranging from the murder 
of Mikhoels or the campaign against “cosmopolitans” 
to how a kerosinka or primus stove worked in the 
communal kitchen, alternate with a documentary 
chronicle, but the characters in this “daily newsreel” 
unexpectedly turn up in the audience. (For example, a 
whole class of girls from a school on the Arbat who 
met with Sergei Mikhalkov in 1951, sits with him in the 
audience and then on the stage now, in 1997). History 
is actualized in the present—and vice versa—right 
before the eyes of the viewer-participant (since the 
studio audience, to some degree, is on equal footing 
with the television viewers who also actively switch on 
their own personal, social and political memory).
The change in the nature, spirit and tenor of the 
interpretation of Soviet history (recent history) can be 
observed in statements made by members of the literary 
profession, particularly those remarks made on the 
occasion of anniversaries of figures in Soviet literature. 
It has been only a few years since the appearance of 
Viktor Yerofeyev’s “A Wake for Soviet Literature,”6 
which created such a furor. And now Yevgeny Popov, 
Yerofeyev’s Metropole comrade-in-arms, a 
representative of the same generational and ideological
group as Erofeyev, writes: “Looking back I think that 
it was really their doing—Mikhalkov, Katayev, 
Chakovsky, the literary functionaries, each of whom 
one may remember [...] with some ambivalence”; 
“When in Rome, do as the Romans do...” And Popov 
concludes with the sentiment: “Judge not, lest ye be 
judged.”7
Thus the denial (sometimes fierce), indignation, the 
abrogation of a connection, and the renunciation of the 
legacy are exchanged for a completely different sort of 
view on the historical (including the artistic), actualized 
and regenerated past. Extremely telling in this regard 
are the projects conceived and executed with the 
utilization of interiors from the Soviet High Style: for 
example, the artists Valery and Natalya Cherkashin 
designed a performance in five acts of “acculturating” 
the totalitarian Empire style of the Moscow Metro: Act 
I (Prologue)—the privatization of the vestibule in the 
station Revolution Square by random and non-random 
passengers/members of the audience; Act II—a 
Communist subbotnik (cleaning and maintaining the 
figures of the revolutionaries); Act III—’’The Love of 
the People for the Art of the People” (an Italian photo 
model in an embrace with a bronze proletarian); Act 
IV—a wedding (the wedding dress is made from 
materials of the 1930s, i.e., newspapers printed with 
bronze paint). These artists have plans for a 
performance for the 850,h anniversary of Moscow—the 
contemplation of the socialist realist Atlantis through 
the water of the municipal swimming pool (for those 
people who can keep their eyes open while swimming).
On the highly rated program “L-Club” three 
participants (as a rule, representing different age 
groups) must guess the price of vodka or champagne in 
a given year. The one who guesses correctly wins a 
special prize. This is also an instance of nostalgia 
gratification. The very genre of “Old Apartment” can 
be equated with a wake at which the deceased is 
remembered with some ambivalence: people, upheavals 
and ordeals notwithstanding, were born, fell in love, 
went to school and worked—a year in one way or 
another yielded certain outcomes. These wakes are 
optimistic—and polemicize with the negative, “gloom 
and doom,” expose tendencies in literature of the 
perestroika and glasnost periods. Without question 
“Old Apartment” also yields a collective,
6. Literatumaia Gazeta, 1990.
7 .“The Rebus of Genius and Villainy as Solved by Valentin 
Katayev," Obshchaia gazeta, January 20,1997.
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psychotherapeutic effect, like a group therapy session. 
By talking about their traumas (the doctors’ plot, the 
fight against cosmopolitans, the resolution on 
Akhmatova and Zoshchenko, etc.), society, here 
represented by the program’s studio audience and the 
viewers at home, theoretically should overcome these 
traumas.
However, in fact collective insight is assigned a 
secondary position. The entertainment both diminishes 
and obliterates the tragic aspects, which results in the 
banalization of history rather than a true understanding 
of it. History is chopped up into noodles and cooked, 
like a soup made from a long list of ingredients, where 
time spent in the camps is stirred in with comic froth.
The general tendency toward cultural-ideological 
compensation and psychotherapeutic therapy for 
historical trauma also informs the program “Russian 
Project,” which is comprised of short subjects on 
clearly delineated themes, brought out at the end as 
“slogans”: for example, “This is my city” or “I love 
you.” These three- and five-minute films are shot with 
the assistance of well-known Soviet artists: Nonna 
Mordyukova, Oleg Yefremov, Zinovy Gerdt, each one 
of whom embodies a host of nostalgic memories for the 
viewer. Each subject has its own internal dramatic 
tension with its own obligatory positive conclusion. For 
example, while Moscow was experiencing glaring 
disparity between the rich, riding around in the most 
expensive makes of automobiles, and the poor who had 
only the option of a transport system that worked ever 
more poorly, the trolleybus driver (Oleg Yefremov) 
with a smile carts along on a nonexistent route a girl on 
roller skates who has hooked onto the “blue trolleybus” 
with her umbrella handle; an elderly Russian woman 
with a sledge-hammer (Nonna Mordyukova) after some 
language that borders on the obscene breaks out into a 
free and easy, life-affirming folk song; a combine 
operator on a collective (?) farm brings his little girl a 
bunny rabbit that he has touchingly saved; an astronaut 
(Nikita Mikhalkov) soars in a space suit over the 
territory of the Russian Federation, rapturously 
declaiming the names of the Russian cities 
(simultaneously an affirmation of his joy at beholding 
state unity). These fabrications, deftly and nonchalantly 
stitched together (like all propaganda), employ 
orphaned psychological stereotypes patterned on Soviet 
models and acted by Soviet artists (to make it more 
convincing). These “positive heroes” as represented by 
the Russian Soviet woman industrial worker, the front­
line soldier, the collective farm worker and elderly
driver are the hope and foundational support for the 
new Russia.
The ideology and aesthetics of nostalgia was tested 
by the documentary film-maker Alexei Gabrilovich in 
the films “The Circus of Our Childhood” (1982), 
“Soccer of Our Childhood” (1984), “The Movies of 
Our Childhood” (1985), a series that easily weathered 
the transition to the post-Soviet “The Courtyards of 
Our Childhood”(1991) and the twelve-part TV serial, 
“The Broadway of Our Youth” (1996), in which the 
generation of the 1960s reminisces about the way of 
life and fashions of the 60s (the stilyagi). The forever 
lost paradise of childhood and youth in the Soviet 
period was revived as a form of relative non­
conformism; in the post-Soviet period it took the form 
of opposition to Soviet style; and now it is viewed as 
nostalgia for a lost stylistics of existence. The Soviet 
style!
T
he cycles of broadcasts about popular artists of 
the past (Gleb Skorokhodov’s “In Search of 
What We Lost,” Leonid Filatov’s “To Be 
Remembered,” Vitaly Vulf’s “Silver Balloon”—all 
based on concrete artistic and human fates) are also 
realized in the genre of the funeral wake, despite the 
fact that Skorokhodov and Filatov are telling their 
stories about the dead, while Vulf’s subjects are still 
among the living though their creative lives are long 
past. Skorokhodov's subjects were Tamara Makarova, 
Lyubov Orlova, Petr Aleinikov, Sergei Martinson; 
Vulf: Oleg Yefremov, Tatyana Lavrova, Galina 
Volchek; Filatov: Inna Gulaya, Gennady Shpalikov, 
Yury Belov, Valentin Zubkov, Vladimir Ivashov, 
Izolda Izvitskaya, Nikolai Rybnikov, Yury Bogatyrev, 
Sergei Stolyarov. The result is paradoxical. On the one 
hand, an indispensable element in these films is the 
idea that the subject’s talent was not allowed to be fully 
realized given the specifics of the Soviet situation, 
while on the other hand, since all of these personalities’ 
successes were in Soviet movies, the Soviet cinema 
appears to have been a powerful and productive system 
(especially when compared to the present day, when the 
stars of yesterday generally are not in demand; e.g., 
Alexei Batalov has not been in a picture for more than 
14 years). The audience’s nostalgic needs thus 
stimulated are then further encouraged by the 
aggressive programming of Soviet blockbusters in the 
TV schedule. During the course of only one week (July 
9-15) the following films were shown: Ivan Vasilevich 
Changes His Profession, Three Comrades (with
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Mikhail Zharov and Veronika Polonskaya), Cruel 
Romance, Thirst, Young Russia, Alone and Unarmed, 
Love and Doves, By the Blue Sea (a film by Boris 
Barnet with Nikolai Kryuchkov in the lead role), 
Volga-Volga, Vasily Buslaev, Alexander Nevsky, Three 
Poplars on Plyushchikha, Kinfolk, I Wander about 
Moscow, Snowball Berry Red, Paternal Home (blurb: 
“a young lady's views on life change fundamentally 
after spending time on a collective farm, filmed in 
1959"), Autumn Marathon, Wedding in Malinovka, 
Alitet Goes Away to the Mountains, Rowanberry Nights 
(blurb: “1984 melodrama about inhabitants of a village 
who abandon it for a more decent place under the sun, 
and about the machine operator Tatyana who does not 
at all wish to do this”). The viewer practically does not 
need to part with the Soviet period of his life, thanks to 
the button on the television time machine that allows 
him to immerse himself—as he chooses—in any 
decade of the Soviet regime, as reinterpreted by that 
same regime. Consequently, on one and the same day, 
for example, July 12th, Russia’s Independence Day, the 
viewer can satisfy himself that in the Khrushchev 
period (/ Walk around Moscow) and in the Brezhnev 
period (Three Poplars on Plyushchika) a student, a taxi 
driver and a woman collective farm worker all lived 
much more romantically, happily and morally upright 
than today. (The television viewer on the same day can 
encounter present-day Russia only in the film Russian 
Brothers, the blurb of which reads: “...in our era 
brother goes against his brother, who is stupefied with 
slogans about freedom and equality...”)8
During the "late" perestroika period the TV 
program "Kinopravda" first made its appearance, 
showing Soviet films from the 1930s and 40s (e.g., A 
Great Citizen). The films were supplied with the 
inevitable background remarks by a journalist who 
explained the ideological, propaganda tasks of the film. 
Then after the broadcast of the film followed a half- 
hour discussion with historians, sociologists, 
philosophers and the viewers themselves—by 
telephone. Whereas now Pyrev's Kuban Cossacks, 
Barnet's Bountiful Summer and Lukov's A Great Life 
are shown without any commentary at all—and with 
invariable and ever growing success.
A response to the altered psychology of the 
television audience can be seen in the New Year
program "Old Songs about the Main Thing," as 
produced by the new generation of aesthetes of tele- 
postmodernism (K. Ernst and L. Parfenov). Pop stars in 
primitively driven kitsch subjects perform well-known 
songs from Soviet blockbusters. But the performers, the 
creators' declarations notwithstanding, clearly fall short 
of the original performances. The new vulgarity (a 
blend of mockery and "in your face") cannot vanquish 
the sincerity and fervor of the old and unfading pictures 
in the viewers' eyes. It only confirms once more that the 
"period of democratic transition" cannot offer anything 
comparable to what was created according to the canon 
of socialist realism.
All of the TV stations—without exception 
—broadcast New Year programs from December 30th 
through the evening of January 4th: "The same faces 
over and over again, the same songs were to be heard, 
and for the hundredth time, if not the thousandth, they 
showed the same films. [...] Longing for the motherland 
(the USSR) and longing for the past... paradoxically 
merged in the forfeited unity of the Soviet people. It is 
not accidental that emotional memory proved to be 
more powerful than rational arguments. And the 
competition for viewers in this instance required 
complete and unconditional capitulation on the part of 
the reformers."9 The effect proved to be the opposite to 
that which the authors of "Old Songs about the Main 
Thing" chose for their roguish (at least in conception) 
broadcast.
In this situation of growing cultural nostalgia, 
Leonid Parfenov, one of the most stylish journalists 
(and now a producer) of post-Soviet television, has 
attempted to introduce historical consciousness into the 
framework of notable events of the year in his project 
"Our Era: k961-1991." (I call your attention to the 
highly telling epithet "our": the absolute prerequisite 
here is that history cannot be repudiated because of this 
or that ideological reason, nor can it be negated, 
truncated or distorted.) So what exactly is this "our" 
era? Playing at impartiality, Parfenov has spurned the 
nostalgic sets of “Old Apartment,” offering instead a 
postmodernist divided screen and eschewing 
corroborative "objects" and "viewers'” reminiscences. 
The studio audience participants are replaced by four 
experts, who in a peculiarly detached manner comment 
on a series of events of supposedly equal importance
8. All blurbs are taken from the weekly supplement to the 
newspaper, Komsomolskaia pravda.




which Parfenov introduces in a deliberate monotone. 
The Brodsky affair, the construction of the Aswan 
Dam, the opening of a new store and the popularity of 
jersey cloth are all given equal weight. If the genre of 
“Old Apartment” can be likened to a collective wake, 
then “Our Era” is without a doubt a dissecting room 
(the geometry, color, the show's atmosphere, its 
illumination, the music—everything is done in the cold 
tones not simply of a surgeon in the operating room but 
rather a medical examiner conducting an autopsy), 
where the beaming screen is the scalpel that cuts 
through the dead tissue, while the host and experts hold 
up the glass containers with the samples they have 
taken and report on the results of the histological 
analysis. Time has frozen after death, it is completely 
torn away from the viewer. Contact not only of the 
casual visitor idly whiling away time in a museum (and 
Parfenov wears precisely such a mask, particularly 
when he goes on his incredibly expensive barefoot 
strolls on the Cuban seaside for the sake of a one- 
minute story—in the authentic setting—about the 1962 
Cuban missile crisis, but also the host's contact with 
time is one void of emotion, like an exhumer with a 
corpse. True, while enjoying his role, the exhumer 
occasionally intrudes directly into the documentary 
frames of the film (with the help of computer graphics), 
appearing as a background figure in state visits, 
obligingly proffering a rifle for the hunt or a towel to 
Khrushchev after washing. This playful intrusion in 
fact carries an unanticipated significance for the host, 
as it demonstrates his compensatory jealousy, an 
unequivocally servile dependence, and his desire to be 
near ("to stand alongside") the main figures of a given 
era.
One must admit that Soviet art, including both 
cinema and television, has proven—at least for 
now—to be aesthetically steadfast if not invincible. 
Despite the declared ideological victory, and despite 
the newly found freedom and the total abolition of 
censorship, including aesthetic censorship, post-Soviet 
culture continues to demonstrate a lingering 
dependence on the language and style, as well as the 
characters and performers of a bygone era. The "new" 
genre repertoire of post-Soviet TV is clearly dependent 
on the old Soviet one. The attempt to break new 
aesthetic ground after shedding the old constraints did 
not succeed. And I believe that is precisely why the 
television professionals assembled at the annual TEFI 
awards ceremony for best television broadcasts were so 
delighted when the award for "Goodnight, Children"
was announced. Filya, Khryusha and Stepashka had 
survived with honor the ideological shocks and 
tribulations and won out over the Americanized 
contender, "Sesame Street."
The state of affairs on television today can be 
likened to a reverse perspective: the objects in space 
(here, in time) are not optically reduced, but instead are 
magnified in accordance with their remoteness. The 
true proportions are violated, while the historical past 
loses its definition, becomes blurred, and is covered 
with an alluring veil, a delicate mist, all enveloped by 
an attractive scent. (The bad smelling, so as not to say 
stinking, rottenness comes together in a single smell, a 
"bouquet," together with the scent of vanished youth, 
love and health.) The further away it is, the larger it 
becomes... And Sergei Solovyov already waxes 
nostalgic about the wonderfulness of the Soviet 
cinema. Amidst the ruins of today's film industry that 
is all too understandable. Will we perhaps again 
discover for ourselves that which Viktor Erofeyev so 
playfully saw fit to annul? The wake, it turns out, was 
premature.
Natalya Ivanova is Deputy Editor of the thick journal 
“Znamya” (Moscow) and President of the Academy of 
Russian Letters,
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INTERVIEW WITH ANATOLY CHUBAIS
Padma Desai
O
n May 22,1999, Dr. Anatoly Chubais, Chief Economic 
Officer, United Energy Systems, Russian Federation, 
and architect of Russia’s privatization program, gave 
an interview to Professor Padma Desai, Harriman Professor of 
Comparative Economic Systems, and Director, Center for 
Transition Economies, Columbia University. Dr. Chubais 
responded to questions on a variety of economic and political 
issues. Below is an edited version of the interview.
Desai: You are such a committed believer in the 
market economy. How did your commitment start?
Chubais: My belief in the market economy has a long 
history. It started long before the market economy 
started in Russia. I graduated from the St. Petersburg 
engineering economics school. It was clear to me that 
the Soviet economy was in terrible shape and was 
headed toward disaster. It was difficult to find 
reasonable answers for the situation in the Soviet 
economy. Articles in textbooks and scientific journals 
discussed different ideas without clearly understanding 
them or how an economy worked. I had a clear 
understanding myself and I found several people in St. 
Petersburg in the mid-eighties and later who had 
similar views. We got to work, started finding books 
that were forbidden in the Soviet Union, and 
established contacts with Western economists that also 
were almost forbidden at that time.
D: Can you remember some books?
C: Yes, the works of Janos Kornai, Milton Friedman 
and Hayek. We also established contact with Yegor 
Gaidar’s team in Moscow. We did not just discuss our 
ideas but undertook solid work, prepared reports, 
researched the New Economic Policy of the early 
1920s in the Soviet Union, and studied Hungarian and 
Yugoslav reforms. All this was not easy to do in the
Soviet Union. Our basic goal was to get a firm idea of 
the fundamental changes that needed to be undertaken.
D: It seems that there was a group of likeminded 
young people who thought like you and who believed 
that there should be a market economy in Russia...
C: Yes. But I would say that we did not have a 
common belief, a clear understanding from the very 
beginning. We tried to find solutions stage by stage, 
we reached the answers in terms of basic changes such 
as private property, competition, and free prices. All 
this came from prolonged discussions. We did not 
accept it from the very beginning.
D: There is a view here that almost all the USAID 
funding was given to the group of reformers led by 
Chubais and that the fund givers from this end did not 
seek out other groups and encourage pluralism in 
Russia. You must be aware of it. How would you react 
to that?
C: You know, it is a very simple question. When we 
started in 1989, in November 1989, it was a team 
consisting of 15, maximum 20 people. We were the 
only team in the country who could discuss, not just 
discuss but make changes. At that time, our problem 
was that there was no alternative. Grigory Yavlinsky 
was with us at that time. He was a member of the team 
that prepared the 500-day program. But the fact was 
that there were no other teams. Before 1991, Imyself 
spent years trying to find individuals everywhere in the 
country—in Novosibirsk, in Moscow Institutes, in St. 
Petersburg, Odessa and Ukraine, in Minsk and 
Sverdlovsk, and several Russian cities. When we 
became part of the government in 1991, all who were 
able to contribute something were invited. They came 
to the government, including Yavlinsky, all except one 
or two. Of course, there were a number of alternative
33
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
government think-tanks but all those were Communist. 
It was simple: we or the Communists.
D: You emerged as a reformer explicitly in 1992 with 
your privatization program, voucher privatization in 
particular, and I believe that it was motivated by 
ideological considerations. You wanted Russian 
industry out of state ownership and control, converting 
industrial units into joint stock companies with 
diversified ownership. Would you agree with that 
view?
C: Absolutely.
D: Private ownership promotes economic efficiency 
via incentives, but that was not your primary motive. 
The decision to issue vouchers to every man, woman 
and child, worth 10,000 rubles each, was a populist 
measure that was calculated to remove state hold over 
industry. People thought that they would become 
instant capitalists by putting their vouchers in this or 
that industry. They supported the program, and indeed 
the President and his reforms in the subsequent April 
1993 referendum. Voucher privatization, in other 
words, was a huge political gambit, which pushed the 
reform momentum forward, kept it alive. Would you 
agree with that analysis?
C: Yes. I think it was clear from the very beginning 
that a simple and transparent way of privatization did 
not exist. So some would gain and others would lose. 
A number of people would be unsatisfied with the 
outcome but the fundamental problem was: will it 
happen or not? From an economic point of view, 
voucher privatization, the voucher itself, was not the 
best way for privatization. More to the point, it was 
clear that the voucher was a substitute for money, and 
if you issue a voucher, you will not get money from 
privatization by selling state properties, but that was the 
price. It was the only way to make it doable.
D: So ultimately, the public sort of felt cheated and 
factories have remained in the charge of Soviet era 
managers who have failed to retool them. So what are 
the gains of privatization in your view?
C: I did not hear the question.
D: Well, in the end, the public did feel cheated. 
General Lebed said later that the voucher would not 
even buy an iron. And the factories, most of them, have 
not been restructured. So what do you think are the 
gains from privatization?
C: Well, let us separate the goal from what was not the 
goal. No one said that the goal of voucher privatization 
was to restructure private property, to restructure 
companies, to attract investments, to speed up 
economic growth or to increase the standard of living, 
because it was clear that the process would take several 
stages. Voucher privatization was just asset 
distribution, leading to the next stage of property 
concentration, resulting in new investment , finally 
leading to enterprise restructuring. There are at least 
four or five stages.
D: So you had some sequencing in mind.
C: Yes, General Lebed and Mayor Luzhkov also stated 
that voucher privatization would not attract investment. 
No one thought that we would immediately get 
economic growth in Russia by distributing vouchers.
D: The harshest criticism was leveled against the loans 
for share program, as a result of which a few bankers 
advanced credits for supporting the government budget 
and for bankrolling President Yeltsin’s 1996 June 
election. Eventually they came to own a sizeable share 
of Russia’s lucrative industrial units. Would you 
repeat that scheme again, loans for shares?
C: No, this kind of scheme could not be repeated. 
There is no need for it. Loans for shares began in 
1995. Till that time, we did not get even small cash 
from privatization because it was property sale for 
vouchers. In fact, no one believed that we could get 
real money from the sale of state property in exchange 
for vouchers. The scheme was controversial at the 
time. Politically, I was in one of the most complicated 
situations being under serious attack from several 
branch ministries, from the railroad and transport 
ministries, from the Duma, and from some governors. 
So the dilemma was simple—either we will not sell 
state shares at all or we will sell them via the 
controversial shares scheme which would bring real 
money to the Russian budget. Don’t forget that with the 
sale of Norilsk Nickel shares, we got the first 170
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million dollars. It was absolutely fantastic. It helped 
the federal budget a lot because the budget situation 
was critical.
D: But you don’t think that as a result of this scheme, 
you brought into being Russia’s oligarchs as powerful 
lobbies and, in spring 1998, Sergei Kiryienko, the 
young reformist Prime Minister, was battling the left 
wing in the- Duma led by the Communists and the 
oligarchs- on the right. So he was dealing with two 
opponents at the same time.
C: Well, let us decide if the oligarchs are good or bad. 
Let us understand that the oligarchs are the big 
Russian private business with the positive and negative 
features they bring to Russia. The fact is this private 
business was the major political resource for preventing 
Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov from becoming 
President in 1996. I strongly believe that the only way 
of preventing Zyuganov from becoming president in 
1996 was the creation of big private business in 
Russia. Their mentality differed from Soviet style 
management. They were mainly younger people 
attracting hundreds of thousands of new employees in 
their companies while restructuring them that began 
with Norilsk Nickel and Yukos, the oil company. They 
started capital investment. They began attracting 
foreign investment. They fought for improving 
efficiency. These were the goals of privatization in its 
next phase. That was the economic side of the story. 
At the same time, they became powerful, wanting to 
use their power according to their understanding of the 
political situation. The Presidential election of June 
1996 raised the question of Yeltsin or Zyuganov, and 
they definitely said Yeltsin. However, in the next 
phase, they thought that they ruled the world and could 
do anything. So there are positive and negative sides 
to the story.
D: Do you think that the influence of private business, 
the so-called oligarchs, has been crippled as a result of 
the financial meltdown of August 1998?
C: No doubt about it. Of the seven big names in 1996, 
half of them did not exist in 1998.
D: Let us move forward in time. Why did the President 
fire Prime Minister Primakov?
C: It was for the political compromise that Primakov 
managed. The price of the political compromise that 
Primakov achieved was increased influence of the 
communists. This role increased constantly, and in the 
next phase, they could be the political force in the 
country.
D: But you don’t think the President removed him 
because Primakov was becoming increasingly popular 
with the public. He fired Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
in March 1998 because Chernomyrdin was beginning 
to have presidential ambitions.
C: I know this President. Let me answer this question 
in a simple way. The President is now going to find his 
successor. So it should be clear to everyone that the 
President will not run in the presidential election next 
year. It is clear that he needs to find someone. The 
problem is not that Chernomyrdin or Primakov gets too 
much public support. The problem is that both are not 
accepted by President Yeltsin as successors. That is 
the reason for firing Primakov.
D: He would not accept them as successors ?
C: No, no.
D: Do you think he has a successor in mind? 1 don’t 
want any names, but does he have a successor in 
mind?
C: At least I know that it is one of his main priorities.
D: How do you assess the new Prime Minister, Sergei 
Stepashin? Even if he formulates a credible 
government, can he manage to overcome Communist 
opposition and the continuing opposition of the 
Yavlinsky Yabloko group, which has declared its 
opposition?
C: Well, I think that Stepashin, despite his background 
and his unfavorable perception in the West because of 
his KGB past, the Chechnya war and things like that, is 
absolutely reasonable, a representative of the new 
generation of Russian politicians. He will be able to
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build a wide political bloc, including Yavlinksy’s 
group. He could build genuine rapport with the 
Russian people because he is good in public 
policymaking, he is good in administrative functions, 
he is good with journalists, he is good with the Duma, 
and he is good with the governors. So he is respected 
by the Russian power elite and has real support of the 
Russian population.
D: So you are hopeful, more than hopeful, that the 
Duma will pass the legislation which the IMF is asking 
before it releases the $4.5 billion funding?
C: No, I don’t think so.
D: They won’tpass it?
C: No, no.
D: So what will happen then?
C: I think that the Duma, after the failed impeachment 
of the President and the overwhelming support of the 
people in favor of impeachment, will seek an 
opportunity to express its protest and the best 
opportunity will be to cancel this IMF package. 
Zyuganov said a week ago that he supported the 
government-IMF agreement, but I am sure that in a 
week, he will say that this agreement is anti-people, 
undermines Russia’s sovereignty and things like that. 
I am sure that the Duma will be against it. I think that 
it is a serious problem. The Stepashin government, the 
IMF and the World Bank should sit down, analyze the 
whole list of problems they have, understand those that 
could be supported by the Duma and let go of the rest.
D: Do you think that the current government will be a 
caretaker government until the Duma December 1999 
elections. That is what Yegor Gaidar said yesterday.
C: Let me tell you my assessment of the government. 
I do not think that Stepashin will immediately 
undertake major political steps and economic 
transformation. He does not need to do that. I do not 
think it is necessary now. In my view, the next stage of 
the Russian economic reforms will not start before the 
next Russian presidential election.
D: What are your best guesses about the composition 
of the new Duma as a result of the December 1999 
elections ?
C: I don’t think that something really radical will 
happen. The communists will still be number one but I 
do hope that they will lose the majority. But there is a 
risk—the extreme left Communists will overcome the 
required 5 percent barrier because of theYugoslav 
NATO bombing. The party of Luzhkov, the Mayor of 
Moscow, will definitely get an entry in the Duma and 
be number one or two.
D: You met with a variety of business groups in 
America. You met with the IMF and the Treasury 
officials. In the old days, the general view was that the 
IMF, pressured by the Treasury, will always support 
Russian reform because Russia has so many nuclear 
warheads that it cannot be allowed to go bust? Do 
you think that they have now gotten rid of this position?
C: In all my discussions with the IMF that I have had 
since 1995,1 never discussed political positions. We 
discussed the IMF program itself, the growth rates of 
money supply and money demand, foreign exchange 
reserves and things like that. We discussed the 
institutional-structural changes that must be made. 
They expressed their understanding, we expressed our 
understanding. The discussions were very tough. But I 
never used the argument that if you include specific 
measures asking us to overhaul, say, the Russian 
Railway Ministry, and if we do not implement them, 
then the Communists will return or that our nuclear 
forces will become unmanageable. Such things are not 
discussed with the IMF or the Treasury.
D: Well, you do not discuss them explicitly, but they 
discuss them among themselves.
C: I don’t know, maybe.





D: Why not? Because people here worry about it, as 
soon as something goes wrong with Russia.
C: Oh, well. A number of worries that exist here are 
absolutely unrealistic. On the other hand, serious 
problems in Russia that are extremely dangerous are 
not understood here. I do not believe at all in Russia 
falling apart. With the increasing awareness of the 
need for a strong ruble, with the adoption of the 1993 
Constitution, with the elections in the Russian regions, 
the chances of Russia’s dissolution, in my view, do not 
exist. It was an issue in 1992, and in 1993 in our 
relations with Tatarstan. Currently, the remaining 
problem that needs to be resolved is Chechnya.
D: Dagestan?
C: Dagestan? No.
D: The final question. When I watch your breathtaking 
career as a reformer, I feel that you regard the reform 
process as an ideological battle between the reformers 
and the communists. I think you are a brilliant 
strategist who believes that every strategy has pluses 
and minuses but that the pluses must dominate, and 
that the process must move forward as a result. You 
do not also want to distinguish between ends and 
means. You believe that you are dealing with a ruthless 
adversary and therefore all means are a fair game.
C: I do believe that everything that has happened in 
Russia in the last decade has been a fight between 
Communists and non-Communists to a greater extent 
than anywhere in Eastern Europe and on a much bigger 
scale, with more risk than in Poland or in East 
European countries. That is the essence of what is 
going on in Russia. It is clear that after several 
generations of Communist life, we could not get out of 
it in one year. At the same time, I believe that the 
strategic choice must be pragmatic. It does not mean 
that there are no moral limits. It does not imply that any 
means can be used for achieving these goals. At the 
very least, if immoral steps are used, they will 
immediately be used by the opponents.
D: Like what?
C: I cannot think of an example. I am trying to explain 
our strategy. Our strategy is to win. We have to win. I 
mean we shall win, but I do not think we can use any 
means for the purpose, even with the understanding 
that the game we are playing is quite serious, and that 
if we lose, we will just disappear physically, there is no 
doubt about it. So we are paying the price that nobody 
in the West has paid for this game. That is why it is a 
very serious game. But that does not mean that we can 
use any means for reaching our goal.
D: Don’tyoufeel tired sometimes? Don’t you want to 
just throw in the towel sometimes?
C: All of us feel tired sometimes. For ten years, I 
have been feeling tired.
D: You should come here and become a professor for 
a while.




INTERVIEW WITH ILIAS AKHMADOV
Dodge Billingsley
T
he following interview with Ilias Akhmadov was taken in 
January 1998, prior to his appointment as Chechen 
Foreign Minister, and renewed war between Russian 
Federal forces and Chechen separatists. The views expressed 
provide thoughtful insight as to how the Chechens perceive 
themselves and their conflict with Russia. More importantly Ilias 
Akhmadov provides a glimpse of how and why Chechens fight.
Can you tell me a bit about your background?
AKHMADOV: In 1991 I graduated from University 
of Rostov with a degree in philosophy. Ours was the 
first class in the Soviet Union to graduate having 
studied a non-Marxist curriculum. In 1991, when the 
events that we are all familiar with concerning 
sovereignty for the Chechen Republic occurred, I 
returned home. I worked for half a year with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that time there was a 
big problem in the mountain region Karabakh. 
Basically, I worked on that, because there were 
individual citizens of our republic who would, on their 
own accord, get involved in that conflict. So the 
governing authorities sent me to get our citizens to 
come home. At the same time I participated in the 
search for those killed during the conflict, and in the 
exchange of prisoners. During the war (with Russia 
1994-96) and after I left the city (Grozny)—I was a 
common member of the militia for three months. When 
I was in the ranks of the militia, I simply did what all 
the other soldiers did. General Basayev, who at that 
time was a colonel, assigned me to headquarters, and 
for most of the war I served as an officer of the general 
staff. And then I returned to Basayev to serve as his 
adjutant. I had other duties when I was the adjutant.
Ilias Akhmadov (left) and unidentified Chechen in Grozny.
How does the Chechen military work? It seems that 
each field commander has his own army.
AKHMADOV: Basayev does not have his own army. 
He was the commander of the reconnaissance and 
diversionary brigade, which is the most elite unit of the 
Chechen army. Currently, that brigade, for all practical 
purposes, has been taken from active service and 
placed under the authority of the supreme commander. 
That is to say, right now the unit isn’t in the barracks, 
but in case of war we will form the brigade again. So 
we aren’t active-duty soldiers. This brigade has 
basically ceased to exist, and is under the authority of 
the supreme commander in case of war. The current 
structure of General (Salman) Raduyev’s army, 
however, is an autonomous structure. But that’s a 
complication of this transitional postwar period.
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There was no Chechen army to speak of before the 
war, at least not the giant army that the Russians talked 
about. All the other components and units were 
organized during the war by region because that was 
the only thing possible. That is, people—local 
militias—organized according to the region where they 
lived. Therefore, the fronts, of which there were seven 
(later, it’s true, they broke up from time to time, and 
sometimes there were as many as 14), were formed by 
region.
Concerning operations—a very large weight was 
given to the personal initiative of the company or group 
commanders on their own part of the front. 
Conforming to some general strategy, all operations 
were conducted at their discretion, and depending on 
the possibilities. Therefore, we basically left the 
Russians, who attempted to do battle with us by the 
book, in a blind alley. The commanders of all our 
units, starting with squad leaders, who commanded 
seven soldiers, all the way to the Front commanders, 
who, without violating the general strategy of the war, 
basically took personal initiative in a wide variety of 
ways. So at headquarters we didn’t have to write any 
special orders. Each person did all that he could, 
having thoroughly studied his own local and his enemy, 
and knowing all the possibilities. Therefore, this war 
was very mobile.
Now that the war has ended, the Chechen army is 
just barely beginning to get its own classical 
organization. Right now it is difficult at first glance to 
distinguish between this new army which is being 
organized, and the old army, which is comprised of the 
remnants of units which existed during the war. There 
aren’t any complex problems regarding the fact that 
right now there seems to be two different armies. In 
any case, they are equally subordinate. These are the 
remnants of those fronts and the remnants of those 
units that haven’t been added to the structure of the 
National Guard and parallel armed forces. When the 
formation of the new army is complete, all extra people 
bearing arms and wearing the uniform will put down 
their weapons and remove their uniforms. For our 
conditions our army will number no more than five to 
six thousand people, but that’s an approximation.
The war had three phases. On the plains the Chechen 
rebels suffered greatly. In the center, between here 
and the mountains, they also suffered.
AKHMADOV: First, there aren’t any Chechen rebels. 
That was a creation of the Russian mass media. The 
word “rebel” calls to mind a semi-underground illegal
organization. This organization is manned by “rebels.” 
But we never had any “rebels.” Unfortunately, some of 
our uneducated commanders got hold of that word 
without thinking too much about its implications. From 
this source it began to spread among us. As I’ve 
mentioned, as of December 1994, we had four active- 
duty units. Everything else was organized 
fundamentally as local militias. Then, toward the end of 
February, Dzhohar Dudayev gave the order to 
dismantle the militias, which then became part of the 
regular structure of the army. So, from February 1995 
on, we have had the armed forces of the Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria. So it’s not possible to call them 
rebels.
Phases? Well, if you make region the criteria, then 
yes, there were three phases. The battle for the city 
{Grozny} from 31 December 1994 to 23 February 1995; 
the battle in the foothills from March 1995 through 10 
May 1995; and on 10 May 1995, the large-scale 
invasion of Vedino, Shatoi, and Zhiyurt began, which 
the Russians managed to practically complete by June 
1995. The raid of the reconnaissance-sabotage battalion 
to Budennovsk under the command of then-colonel 
Basayev ruined these plans. Each of these three 
phases, of course, has different characteristics.
The battle of the city—urban warfare, even from 
the viewpoint of military strategy, is very complicated. 
Here is what happened; there was a massive invasion at 
dawn on 31 December from three directions with a 
force of about 650 armored units. Of course, all 
numbers are relative. It’s very difficult to say how 
many there actually were.
Now there is a lot of discussion about whether the 
encounter was planned or not. It’s hard for me to say. 
To tell you the truth, the outburst of the Russians was 
a surprise for me, because on the evening of 30 
December, cannonades could be heard somewhere off 
at the city limits. I don’t know how well informed 
headquarters was at the time. I was still an enlisted 
member of the militia, but for me the movement was 
unexpected. If one were to analyze this situation today, 
why there weren’t any barricades set up, and why the 
Russians weren’t met on their way to the city, we didn’t 
have the physical strength to organize even one echelon 
of defense around the city.
We had so few people, that it seems fantastically 
improbably now, but in reality, from 31 December to 
the end of January, there were about 450 permanent 
defenders of the city. That’s it. Simply put, all these 
forces were placed in front of the presidential palace, 
and the Russians made their way peacefully, practically 
to the presidential palace.
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The Russians went along, not obeying any of the 
rules of war, because the distance between armored 
units was between three and five kilometers, which is 
just crazy. They were all drunk, and to my recollection, 
neither the officers nor the soldiers realized what was 
happening the first day.
The Russians were cut off in the region of Zh/D 
train station. There was a very fierce battle there, and 
also in the area immediate to the canning factory. A 
part of the column was also left in the area of 
Khankaly. From 31 December to 6 January these 
columns were cut off. On 7 January the Russians struck 
with even more force. The strongest artillery attacks on 
the city took place on 7 January. The Russians then 
managed to bring in their transport units from the north. 
These units united with the groups that had been cut 
off, and the second phase of the defense of the city 
began.
By 17 January, there was no coordinated tactical or 
strategic attempt to hold the presidential palace. When 
it was hit by depth charges, the commander of 
Headquarters, Division General Mashadov gave the 
order to move to the second echelon of the city’s 
defense which was forming on the other bank of the 
river Sunzhi. All units defending the city had already 
moved there in an organized manner. In this way the 
second phase of the battle for the city began.
The basic tactic of warfare in the city was 
conducted by mobile groups of ten to twelve people, 
each group being armed with one grenade launcher, 
two snipers, and the rest with automatic weapons. 
Before 17 January, there weren’t any well-defined lines 
of defense. The groups were always on the move. This 
made things much more difficult for the Russians, who 
attempted to fight the war by the books. With strong 
artillery preparation, and support by frontal aviation, 
the Russians began to move. But after one or two 
armored vehicles were burned, and ten to fifteen people 
were killed, they fell back and then a week later went 
through the quarter again. In fact, not one quarter was 
taken by the Russians in the attack. They occupied 
only areas that had been left unoccupied by our units 
and the militias. If there had been a line of 
communication between our units and the militias, I 
think that the defense of the city would have lasted 
longer.
While the battles were going on in the city, Dzhohar 
Dudayev gave the order to form a line of defense by 
region. That’s how the seven fronts were created. Due 
to the movement of the Russian troops, certain areas 
became hotspots and received the status of separate 
fronts. Now it’s difficult to determine how many 
existed, and for how many days.
The situation was such that from the beginning of 
March until the end of the first ten days of May the 
Russians didn’t enter into direct confrontations. The 
largest losses on our side occurred exactly during that 
time period, because it was necessary for us to at least 
demonstrate our presence. The Russian troops 
occupied positions not more than half a kilometer from, 
or on the outskirts of, a populated area. The Russians 
stayed in place. The neutral zone was about one and a 
half or two kilometers. In the mornings, helicopters 
would hover over our positions and bomb us. The 
artillery was always at work. Contact occurred when 
our small diversionary groups could cut off the 
Russians when they moved in columns or when they 
transported provisions, military supplies, or water. The 
biggest losses our military forces suffered were from 
artillery preparations and bombardment.
On the 10lh and 1 llh of May, as I’ve already said, 
the large-scale invasion of these three basic areas by 
Russian troops began. The third stage of the war 
began: the war in the mountains. So the Russians 
managed to move forward pretty quickly in these three 
areas: along the Videnski ravine, the Argunski ravine, 
and in the direction of Shatoi. And these three key 
points fell within three or four days of each other. It 
happened pretty quickly. There was no chance of 
withstanding the air attacks. The most powerful 
weapons which we had were large-caliber machine 
guns, 14.5 and 12.7, for which there were almost no 
rounds. Even when we had antiaircraft weapons, the 
Russian troops inflicted noticeable damage. As I’ve 
already mentioned, the subsequent military operations 
that Basayev commanded stopped that movement.
What followed was fairly non-traditional if looked 
at from the viewpoint of classical warfare. 
Negotiations began which lasted almost a year. During 
this period of negotiations our troops occupied all the 
territory and entrenched themselves in the city 
practically without firing a shot. The next phase of the 
war began: the March 1996 invasion by the Russians. 
The truth is that the lack of military supplies due to 
losses of the already drawn-out war, and the 
shortcomings of the population created fairly 
consequential problems, so our troops once again found 
themselves pushed back into the unmaneuverable 
mountains.
Then we undertook two operations. On 6 March: a 
scouting operation into Grozny, when a small group, 
about 1000 people, went unopposed into the city and 
held it for five days. The Russians didn’t undertake 
one operation that hindered the entrance of our troops 
into the city. They were literally busy saving their 
lives. Basically, during these five days, the Russians
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didn’t take any initiatives at all. Then our units were 
ordered by Maskhadov to leave their positions in an 
organized manner.
August 1996, the most unexpected turning point in 
the war occurred for everyone, not only for us. 
Basically, our units again went into the city, and 
practically destroyed the Russian units that were there. 
Therefore the initiative of General Lebed is not nearly 
as humanitarian as it has been portrayed. He simply 
saved the remains of the defeated army. Two or three 
points were already entirely surrounded, where more 
than 1500 Russian soldiers were ready to surrender, 
and the only thing that saved these groups was 
Maskhadov’s order.
What was the significance of Basayev’s raid on the 
Russian city, Budenovski?
AKHMADOV: Well, in the first place, the Budenovski 
raid had more political than tactical significance. But 
if you look at it from the viewpoint of the art of war, it 
shows that, in spite of all the announcements about the 
reports of the Russian military leaders which were 
located in this military theatre of the Chechen Republic 
to the effect that our army was destroyed, or that 
General Dudayev had completely lost control of his 
units, the ingenious movement 350 kilometers inward, 
and the capture of territory, with a group numbering 
157 to 160 soldiers, speaks for itself. General Basayev 
lost only 19 soldiers during the ingenious five-day 
operation. Of these 19 soldiers, if I’m not mistaken, 
only three of them were killed by the most elite units of 
the Russian army during the five-hour blitz. The rest of 
them were killed during the confusion of the first few 
minutes, when they attacked the unit on the right side. 
It was very difficult because of the large civilian 
population around.
Then when they dug in and occupied positions in 
the hospital, they were surrounded. You can imagine 
how thick a ring the Russian army was able to make in 
the depths of its own territory. During all five days of 
this firestorm, only three people were lost. The 
positions were occupied with such discipline that the 
Russians were simply fended off. Basayev held control 
all the way until the last attempt. And the results of 
this situation were incredible. Looking at it from a 
military viewpoint, it doesn’t even make sense to assign 
credit. I think that even the Americans, and I don’t 
mean this offensively, when they evacuated their 
embassy in Iran, made many more mistakes than 
Basayev did when he conducted this operation. I think
that it has a very strong place, at least amongl 
operations conducted after World War II.
I’ve heard the war broken into three phases. How 
many losses were there in each stage?
AKHMADOV: Well, that’s fairly difficult, because as 
I’ve already said, the Chechen army still had not gone 
through a classical stage of formation. That is, this 
whole system of reporting losses and current strength 
exists in an army which has already been completely 
formed, thus making it easier to keep track of these 
things than it was for us. The total number of losses 
among our combatants was based on the fact that 
besides those who actually bore arms at the time, 
civilians who took up arms and came to fight with us 
were also included. They usually suffered most of the 
losses, those who didn’t have experience. And 
according to the reports of our unit commanders, about 
3500 to 4000 of our opposition forces were killed. But 
many civilian people who only fought for literally one 
hour were killed. As soon as the Russians entered the 
city, anyone who jumped up with a weapon in his 
hands was killed within the hour. It’s difficult to 
confirm these numbers, so they are fairly relative.
Most of the losses that occurred during the battles 
of 1995 were of people who didn’t have a weapon and 
were constantly trying to obtain a weapon. The tactic 
was extremely simple. If a Russian soldier with an 
assault weapon was left in the neutral zone, Russian 
snipers used the following tactic: Whoever crawled up 
to the weapon first was wounded. He would, naturally, 
cry for help. You can leave a corpse until nighttime, 
when it is possible to retrieve it, but when a wounded 
soldier cries for help, usually three or four people 
would also die trying to retrieve a wounded soldier. In 
this way it was sometimes possible to kill, with one 
assault rifle, five or six people who didn’t have a 
weapon and wanted to obtain that weapon. These were 
the largest losses. Those units which were mobile and 
got around quickly suffered practically no losses. By 
the way, among those who were armed during this 
period of winter street battles in Grozny, we had even 
fewer losses then later during the battles in the foothills 
and the subsequent battles in May through June 1995.
The number of Russians lost is difficult to count not 
only for us, but also for the Russians themselves. 
Because they operated on the system of combined 
units. There were practically no numbered units here. 
The numbered units were located at their places of 
deployment, and from these numbered units, combined 
units were formed. A certain contingent of a numbered
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regiment was taken from two or three regiments and 
formed into a new unit that was not counted anywhere. 
Well, it is figured somewhere in the operational 
command of the general staff in Russia.
I personally collected about 2500 service records 
between 31 December and 7 January, that is, the 
soldiers’ army certificates. It also wasn’t possible to 
collect these papers from the corpses that were burned, 
and not every commander collected these papers. So 
it’s a fairly arbitrary number. According to the 
testimony of the general staff, during this one-week 
period, they lost about 4000 people in the city. The 
Maiyakopski brigade and the Samarski 181st regiment 
ceased to exist. About 350 armored units were 
destroyed during the New Year blitz.
The loss of soldiers was a problem to calculate. As 
a rule, any change of assignment for a soldier is noted 
in a booklet on the day of his arrival at this new duty 
station. A stamp is immediately placed in the 
operational area to the effect that the particular soldier 
has arrived at the unit and is ready for duty, and a seal 
is affixed. But among theses 2500 service records 
there were only a few dozen that had these formalities 
in them. The rest of the soldiers weren’t included on 
any list of any unit. That is to say, they didn’t exist.
What was it like for an ordinary member of the militia 
to participate in military operations? Can you relate 
any personal experiences ?
AKHMADOV: On one hand, of course, it was 
difficult for us to do battle with the Russians, because 
they were fully equipped. Take, for instance, one 
Russian motor rifle battalion. If you look at the level 
of equipment for their maintenance bases, their 
artillery, artillery support, air support, communications 
support, corrective support, and medical equipment, 
one motor rifle battalion was equipped better than the 
entire Chechen army. So there were a great many 
difficulties. On the other hand, one advantage we had 
was that most of the Chechens had served in the ranks 
of the Soviet army. Maskhadov was an officer in the 
Soviet army for a long time. He retired as a colonel. 
Most of the Chechens had served in the active-duty 
ranks of the Soviet army. For instance, I served in the 
Soviet army five years.
It is a very great advantage when the enemy speaks 
a language you understand very well. Tactics like radio 
misinformation were used quite often. The radios in 
absolutely every captured transport or tank were all 
tuned to the frequency of it’s own unit. Our radio 
operators often managed to get Russian firepower 
aimed directly at Russian positions. The tactic of
penetrating between two columns traveling in parallel 
was also used. This usually happened when columns 
were marching at night, or when we penetrated between 
two positions, because the Russians had a great lack of 
coordination between the units of the internal army and 
the normal army. It was enough to get between two 
columns, fire off a couple of shots in one direction or 
the other, and these columns would start to mow each 
other down, sometimes for two or three hours. 
Sometimes only when both sides independently called 
for air or artillery support, did they start to understand 
that they were fighting themselves. These tactics were 
used very often.
Then, we, the people who lived in the city, who 
know every little corner, often felt quite at ease and 
quite safe in the city. There were times when groups of 
up to 70 people made their way quietly through dead 
space when Russians were within 30-40 meters on 
either side.
Basically, the knowledge of the language, the 
knowledge of the Russian psychology, and the structure 
of their philosophy was a great advantage. The 
Russian army is not very different from the Soviet 
army. The only difference is that there are no 
Chechens in the Russian army. It’s the same 
tremendously large and immobile machine that the 
Soviet army was. It was very easy to take advantage of 
that. The Chechens speak Russian without and accent 
and it wasn’t difficult to lead them astray. And then at 
night the Russians became interested only in the area in 
which they were physically located. They lost interest 
in everything that didn’t concern their personal safety. 
That’s a terrible shortcoming of an invading soldier. 
Therefore our troops came to life at night. Constant 
movement and night battles. This really wore the 
Russians down. Those were the basic tactics. So, for 
instance, thinking about Remarque’s novel, All Quiet 
on the Western Front, that, of course, was a completely 
different war.
Regarding the death of the first president of the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, General Dudayev, well, 
a big mistake that many Western observers and the 
Russians made was to attempt to characterize the war 
on our territory from 1994 to 1996 according to 
classical military thinking. I’ll give you an analogous 
example: The Russians stubbornly tried to raise an 
ensign over the remains of Rezkom, the building that is 
the presidential residence here. General Maskhadov 
ordered the defenders to desert it because there wasn’t 
any tactical or strategic reason to preserve it. It was 
simply a ruined building.
Russians didn’t approach the building for another 
12 hours, and then raised some rag. I don’t even
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remember which one. Maybe it was from the 144th 
motor rifle regiment. Look at the commotion that was 
caused by the raising of the ensign over the remains of 
the Rezkom. The Russians thought that if they raised 
that rag over this palace that the war was over. It was 
stupid. The Chechens have led a regular, systematic, 
and continuous war against the Russians for 300 years, 
since 1708 AD, you could say. We’ll continue to fight 
as long as there is one square foot of land on which we 
can stand, and as long as we are still alive.
For us, classical European examples, such as the 
raising of an ensign over the remains of a presidential 
palace, don’t mean anything. It’s the same thing 
concerning the death of Dudayev. General Dudayev 
died like a soldier at his post. His death didn’t give rise 
to any disappointment of the Chechens, and of course 
it didn’t weaken us in any way. For a Chechen at war, 
the highest reward is death. So Dudayev found himself 
among those who Allah had smiled upon. The death of 
Dudayev didn’t give rise to any infighting or 
perturbations among the Chechen leadership. 
Everything continued as before. Everything was 
accepted as the natural consequences of war. On the 
death of Dudayev, in accordance with the constitution 
of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, his vice president, 
Inderbiev, took his place. Yes, we accepted the fact 
with sorrow, but it didn’t shake anyone’s belief in the 
truth we are fighting for. So we accept it all very 
philosophically. Chechens accept death very 
philosophically, especially during war. General 
Dudayev was worthy of the death of a soldier. We are 
just proud that he courageously went down the path 
that Allah laid down for him on this Earth, from the 
beginning until the end.
The cult of the warrior is strong in Chechnya. Can you 
comment on this, and also on the role that religion 
plays?
AKHMADOV: I think that Chechens are a peaceful 
people, but Chechens are warriors. To be a warrior is 
to have a deeper and broader understanding than people 
who are simply warmongers. Yes, Chechens are 
warriors, but Chechens aren’t like classical warriors. 
Chechens take life in the barracks very hard, because as 
you know, barracks life, with all its characteristics, 
subverts any individuality a person has. Although 
Chechens are warriors, that doesn’t stop us from 
feeling the joy of life and beauty, or to be philosophers.
Concerning religion among the Chechens, there is 
a strong Sufi influence among us. That is to say,
Islamic philosophy. Almost every Chechen is an 
autonomous Sufi. That’s a rather complex side of our 
life, and difficult to explain within the boundaries of 
this interview. But in spite of, and maybe because of 
the fact that for practically 400 years, we have been in 
a state of war, we prize peace, and all that is connected 
with life. You see, after such a terrible apocalypse, and 
among all these ruins, you can still see so many people 
laughing. Chechens accept it philosophically.
It doesn’t really scare us that our buildings have 
been destroyed. Earlier, during the Russian-Caucasus 
war, you built during the night, and nobody could give 
you a guarantee that the village would last until 
tomorrow. In spite of that, people built in order to have 
a normal place to live for at least one day. The next 
day the Russians would come and destroy the village. 
The Chechens didn’t give up. They built another village 
again, and it went on like that. I’ll tell you that for the 
Chechens to be like the Russians, who love everything 
connected with a material life, would be very difficult.
I’ll tell you a quote from a general who participated 
in that old war, Major General Ol’shevski. In his 
memoirs, An Expedition in the Caucasus, he writes 
something which very strongly grabbed my attention, 
and burned itself into my memory. It went 
approximately like this: the concept of property among 
the Chechen people is absolutely atrophied. When we 
invade their cities, you don’t see any Chechen 
anywhere trying to save his belongings or any of his 
wealth. All of them, from the youngest to the oldest, 
are motivated by one desire-—to shed as much of the 
invaders’ blood as possible. That is, in that moment 
when war breaks out, none of these things have any 
meaning. Everyone turns all of their attention on the 
war in order to defend their freedom and independence. 
Of course this didn’t just crystallize in one day. In 
order to become who we are today, the Chechens have 
gone through a great many ordeals, which probably not 
every nation has had to pass through. And 
nevertheless, in spite of all the negative things which 
are evident here, I think that the Chechens are very 
good people who courageously face life, and who are 
very aware of the space they occupy and the period of 
time they are in.
What strategic significance do the mountains have?
AKHMADOV: The mountains? The mountains have 
many meanings, and they are all important for us. But 
first and foremost, the mountains have made us who we 
are. Secondly, the Almighty punished us on this slice 
of the Northern Caucasus because it turns out that our
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people inhabited a strategic position. That is, whether 
or not we want to admit it, we occupy a key position, 
both political and military, and by virtue of this we also 
play an important role in forming the mentality of the 
Northern Caucasus. There are many mountains, and 
it’s because of these mountains. The mountains have 
done this to us, and I think that trying to consider them 
only as a natural defense undermines their significance. 
No, it’s an outlook on life: an enormous philosophical 
outlook which formed this population that today enjoys 
peace. In short, it’s the Chechens.
There are many different ethnic groups in Dagestan; 
does that play a role in the situation in Dagestan!
AKHMADOV: The war in Chechnya was quite 
natural. Chechnya never voluntarily entered into a 
dependent relationship with Russia. But Dagestan, in 
spite of the fact that part of Dagestan took part in the 
Russian-Caucasian war under the leadership of Imam 
Shaganin, in time was broken up into Hun-ruled 
territories and displayed its will to be loyal to the 
rulers. And therefore, only a small part of Dagestan 
fought in the last war, and for the Russians it’s a sort of 
outpost between Transcaucasia and the Northern 
Caucasus. You can consider it that way. If uprisings 
occur in Dagestan, then I think the situation will 
radically change the shape of things in the Northern 
Caucasus.
There is another problem that differentiates the 
situation in Dagestan from that in Chechnya. The 
Chechens never had any interdependent relations. That 
is, there weren’t ever any feudal lords. Everyone was 
equal. In Dagestan slavery flourished among some 
groups and there were only a few groups which 
managed to maintain any kind of independence. So a 
sort of Dagestan aristocracy developed. And that also 
had something to do with Dagestan’s participation in 
the war. Today it’s represented by clans. When they 
talk about clans in Chechnya, that’s nonsense. The 
only clans that exist in Chechnya are those that the 
Soviet system gave rise to. That is, a person is 
appointed to some post, and a clan formed around him. 
But this clan wasn’t connected by genealogy. There 
was no blood connection. A clan could be made up of 
me and my friend, who shares my things of value, from 
my possessions to my food. It’s a little bit different in 
Dagestan. There are many more people making up the 
political process than in Chechnya. So there’s a very 
complicated mass of political collisions. If there is a
Older generation of Chechen warriors.
flare-up there, I’m sure that the situation in the 
Northern Caucasus will change radically.
Will the Russians take action against Chechnya 
because, either officially or unofficially, Chechnya is 
helping Dagestan?
AKHMADOV: It’s obvious that the Russians will take 
action not only in the case of a war with Dagestan, but 
in any spot in the Northern Caucasus and even in 
Transcaucasia. Now there are a few hotspots. They 
are the problem in Abkhazia and Georgia, the problem 
of Southern Ossetia and Georgia, the problem of 
Ingushetia and Ossetia, and the problem of Dagestan. 
In all these spots, literally, the situation is such that 
probably only a small push would be needed to start 
things. They haven’t quieted down and they aren’t 
solved. They’ve just been muffled. It’s just like 
doping up a sick person on morphine to take away the 
pain, and then doing nothing about his illness. At the 
present time, the Russians don’t have any mechanism 
to solve such problems. And if, in even one of these 
spots, military action begins to take place, I think the 
Russians will take extreme measures to block the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. I think that if a war 
doesn’t happen in Dagestan, you could expect direct 
interference in Chechnya from Russia, who would 




I think it will still be a long time before one can 
peacefully sigh and say that in the Caucasus some sort 
of stability has been achieved. Perhaps Chechnya will 
flower on its own now. We can build our production, 
and resolve our social problems. Maybe Dagestan will 
be on its own. But until that time when all of the 
populations of the Northern Caucasus obtain their 
independence, they won’t have the opportunity to 
establish their own governments. Then this problem 
will continue. As long as Russia still has a presence 
here, we will always have either active conflicts or the 
potential for conflict. But the Russian process of 
leaving the Caucasus began in 1991. They came here 
with much bloodshed, and they’ll leave here with much 
bloodshed. There’s no doubt! I don’t know how long 
it will last. Maybe 50, maybe 100 years. But the 
process has begun. I think that the explosive potential 
of this region will disappear only when the Russians 
are gone.
Despite our small numbers, the Chechens have 
survived, thanks to the fact that we follow our 
principles. And one of our principles happens to be 
that one should help the weak. To help the weak 
defend their own freedom, because there is nothing 
greater than freedom. We have declared that for 300 
years, paying for it with our own blood, and always 
motivated by this freedom.
Dodge Billingsley has been engaged in security 
research in the Caucasus since 1993. He has worked 
on defense-related films for the History Channel and 
the Discovery Channel. He is the producer and 
director of the film" Immortal Fortress: A Look Inside 
Chechnya’s Warrior Culture," awarded the 1999 
Bronze Plaque.
What is the nature of Chechen support in the Dagestan 
war?
AKHMADOV: I can answer this question from a 
political viewpoint. I think that support that expresses 
itself in terms of equipment, ammunition, or soldiers 
sent there is insignificant compared to the fact that the 
war in Dagestan is a war for national freedom. It’s the 
fact that we fought the Russian Empire together with 
the Dagestanis for many years. I think it’s a war with 
which we empathize in our hearts. I’m not talking 
about the government, that is the business of official 
politics, but empathy in the hearts of every Chechen. 
That’s the only answer I can give.
Concerning the previous point, in which I said that 
the Chechens have empathy in their hearts. The war in 
Abkhazia, Georgia versus Abkhazia, gave rise to that 
feeling in the hearts of Chechens. As a result Abkhazia 
won. Little Abkhazia was victorious over enormous 
Georgia. But it’s very important to remember that in 
that war
the Chechens did not fight the Georgians. The 
Chechens simply followed their principle: they helped 
the little guy. If Russia invaded Georgia today, and I’m 
simply talking about the common people, the Chechens 
would go help the Georgians.
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U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR DEMOCRATIC 
REFORM IN RUSSIA: AN ASSESSMENT 
Clifford Kupchan
U
.S. assistance programs to promote democracy 
and civil society in Russia have been 
successful in helping Russia embark on the 
long, difficult road of building democracy. Only eight 
years ago, Russia was part of the Soviet Union; 
democracy was proscribed by the regime. Since then, 
Russia has taken important steps forward-mostly on its 
own, but with U.S. help.
Russia is today an electoral, though not a liberal, 
democracy. Elections have been accepted, by all major 
political actors, as the only game in town for assuming 
political power. The December 1999 Duma election is 
the latest in a series of national and regional elections. 
Turnout rates have been high (61 percent voted in the 
Duma election), the elections have generally met a 
“free and fair” standard, and a significant number of 
incumbents have lost. Given Russia’s thousand-year 
authoritarian history, progress made during the last 
decade is remarkable.
Yet Russia’s democracy is young and flawed. A 
liberal democracy features an independent judiciary, a 
respected constitution, an independent media, the rule 
of law, a robust civil society, strong political parties, 
and a strong and democratically-elected parliament. 
Many of these attributes are weak in today’s Russia; 
corruption is endemic, and political parties are weak. 
But Russia has taken steps forward, with U.S. 
assistance, on many elements of liberal democracy. 
Regarding civil society, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are growing across Russia. 
Russians, perhaps for the first time, now enjoy 
“political space.” Access to the internet and 
independent media, freedom of assembly and 
expression, vastly increased (if incomplete) freedom of 
religion—these aspects of Russian life are now almost 
taken for granted. An independent judiciary and media 
are fledgling, but growing. Again, these are Russian 
achievements-but U.S. assistance helped in each area.
In this essay, I will discuss the most successful 
democracy programs of the United States, our less 
productive ones, and where U.S. efforts will be focused
in the future. My central point is that our most 
successful programs have proven to be grassroots 
programs such as exchanges, support for NGOs, and 
internet access. These programs have yielded higher 
dividends than those that work with the Russian central 
government or with existing, “top-down” institutions. 
One of the main lessons learned over the past decade is 
that building the range of liberal democratic institutions 
in Russia will be a long-term, generational, even 
multigenerational process. The best way for America 
to help is by persistently engaging Russians at the 
grassroots.
America’s Most Successful Efforts 
to Promote Democratic Reform in 
Russia
U.S. exchange programs have proven to be among 
our best vehicles to promote democracy in Russia. The 
United States has concentrated resources on exchanges, 
and through them has promoted more democratic, pro­
market mindsets among the next generation of Russian 
leaders. Over 40,000 Russians have visited the U.S. on 
exchanges since 1993, exposing them to the American 
system and providing training in practical democratic 
and market-related skills. Participants have included 
students, entrepreneurs, regional government officials, 
and many others.
Exchanges work at the grassroots by changing 
mindsets. And there is increasing evidence in the 
development literature that promoting ownership of 
ideas (in this case, ideas about democracy) is more 
effective in promoting reform than standard IMF or 
World Bank conditionality.1 The studies show that 
domestic support for reform is the most important
See The World Bank, Assessing AID: What Works, What 
Doesn’t and Why (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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variable affecting the success of aid. 
Exchanges-exposure to the U.S. and alternative ideas 
about organizing society-are among our best ways of 
promoting support for the idea of democracy among 
Russians. Exchanges, therefore, both directly promote 
democratic reform and create an environment in which 
other democracy programs can be effective.
There is also empirical evidence that exchanges 
work. Surveys show that returned high school exchange 
participants are more supportive of democracy and 
market ideas than their counterparts.2 They also show 
that participants in business-oriented exchanges are 
more supportive of rapid economic reform and foreign 
investment, and are more optimistic than their peers 
about Russia’s future.3
The U.S. Regional Initiative (RI) focuses a wide 
range of assistance programs on progressive Russian 
regions. The goal is to create successful models of 
regional development which can be replicated in other 
regions and serve as models for reform of the central 
government. Democracy building is one key 
component of the Regional Initiatives, which also 
include programs that focus on small business 
development and investment promotion. The U.S. is 
currently targeting Novgorod, Samara, and Sakhalin; a 
fourth site will begin this year in Tomsk. RI has helped 
increase citizen participation in regional government, 
bring more transparency to budget processes, and 
strengthen regional NGOs.
U.S. assistance to NGOs has strengthened Russia’s 
rudimentary civil society; NGOs actively involve 
citizens in Russian political life. There are now over 
65,000 active, registered NGOs in Russia. At least 15 
percent have received U.S. support. Fifty-four U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) NGO 
Resource Centers have provided small grants and 
training to NGOs across Russia. The Siberian Resource 
Center in Novosibirsk has been particularly successful 
in reaching more than 1,000 grassroots organizations 
across an area the size of the continental U.S.
Though the majority of Russian NGOs are small, 
some have influenced legislation at the national and 
regional level. NGOs that help regional and local
U.S. Information Agency, “FLEX Alumni: A Breed Apart From 
Other Russian Youth,” Opinion Analysis, September 1, 1998.
3 Susan Lehman, “BFR Program Evaluation,” March 22, 1999 
(unpublished manuscript).
governments deliver social services play an especially 
important role in Russia. In Novgorod, for example, 
the U.S. helped the regional government set up a 
competitive bidding process that resulted in NGOs 
providing a number of local services. The newly 
formed Russian Association of Crisis Centers has 
brought together over 40 local centers that assist 
victims of domestic violence.
The U.S. has effectively supported the growth of 
independent media, especially in Russia’s regions. 
Most Russian media are heavily controlled by oligarchs 
and regional administrations, but some outlets have 
increased their advertising revenue and independence. 
AID, through the NGO Internews, has assisted over 
300 regional non-state TV stations throughout Russia. 
Some of these stations offer very open, critical views of 
local and national events. Independent stations have 
raised their audience share to over 30 percent in many 
local markets. In the print sector, the National Press 
Institute (which has received U.S. support through New 
York University) has provided professional and other 
support to 110 non-state papers, increasing the papers’ 
self-sustainability in the vast majority of cases.
Together with the Open Society Institute, the U.S. 
Information Agency (now part of the State Department) 
has increased Russians’ access to the internet. 
Bringing the free flow of ideas to Russia promotes 
democracy and civil society. Also, the restoration of 
authoritarianism is much harder once citizens are 
accustomed to intellectual freedom. Since 1996, USIA 
has established over 50 public access internet sites 
across Russia and the New Independent States 
(NlS)-reaching over 10,000 users. Thirty-three of 
these sites are in Russia.
Russia hjts established a culture of relatively free 
and fair elections. Though many aspects of this culture 
remain problematic, including campaign finance and 
equal access for candidates to the media, Russia’s 
adoption of elections is a seminal advance. At least in 
a small way, U.S. assistance helped promote Russia’s 
electoral culture. The AID-funded International 
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) has helped 
develop more professional election procedures 
throughout Russia by working with the Central 
Election Commission. It has also helped increase the 
capacity of regional authorities to hold elections, and 
has conducted a range of voter education programs.
Finally, the U.S. has worked to promote judicial 
reform in Russia-these programs have met with more 
success than is commonly recognized. After
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considerable exposure through exchanges to the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Russian 
experts established the Judicial Department in 1997 
outside the Ministry of Justice. The Department 
administers the Courts of General Jurisdiction. Control 
of the courts by an apolitical organ of the judiciary 
significantly increases judicial independence. In 1998, 
the Department received its first separate appropriation, 
though it is seriously underfunded. U.S. programs are 
working with the Judicial Department to increase its 
independence.
USAID has for several years worked with the 
Commercial (Arbitrazh) Courts - because they have 
always been independent of the Ministry of Justice and 
more open to reform. We have worked with the 
Commercial Courts to train hundreds of judges in 
fundamental concepts of market-oriented commercial 
law. Also, we are working with the Russian council 
that sits in judgment of judges accused of ethics lapses, 
helping it improve work on legal ethics.
The U.S. has also emphasized grassroots legal 
reform. AID-funded American Bar Association 
programs work with lawyers and legal professional 
groups to develop advocacy skills and responsiveness 
to public needs. We have supported law school 
curriculum reform, and the expansion of clinical legal 
education and legal clinics. These clinics - examples 
include clinics on environmental, labor, and women’s 
issues-help channel citizens’ real grievances into the 
courts. They are in effect helping create a “demand” 
side to legal reform by promoting use of and trust in the 
courts.
However, building respect for the rule of law and 
stemming corruption will be a long-term process. 
Respect for civil and commercial law remains at a low 
level. Corruption is pervasive in Russia. While U.S. 
assistance has promoted reform on rule of law issues, 
foreign aid cannot induce major changes in this most 
basic element of Russian society. Only the political 
will of the Russian people, acting through a democratic 
political system, can eradicate corruption, build a 
strong and independent judiciary, and install the rule of 
law.
The Problem of
Interest Articulation in Russia
I will now turn to a key area where U.S. assistance 
has worked with lower rates of success. In Russia, 
interest aggregation and articulation into the political 
system have not developed to a significant extent. 
There is very little “bottom up” communication of 
interests from Russian citizens to their politicians. 
Political parties serve this function in Western 
democracies, but political parties have not matured as 
many expected in Russia, despite well-designed efforts 
to nurture them in our assistance program. Nor have 
NGOs stepped in to fill much of this void. It is a 
central problem in the development of Russian 
democracy.
Many reasons for the lack of interest articulation 
are plausible. First, Russians do not have an answer to 
the question: “How can democracy improve my life?” 
Most Russians are fundamentally not convinced that it 
can. They see no evidence that democracy can or will 
improve the quality of their lives.4 Many Russians do 
not think that elected officials effectively represent 
their interests. Russian history has left post-Soviet 
Russia with no organic link between the people and the 
government, and the Yeltsin regime did not try to build 
this link.
Second, Russian political culture remains 
predominantly “top-down” in structure. Elite politics 
and interests count more than public opinion. Almost 
all political parties are elite structures-either Kremlin 
dominated (Unity), personality-driven (Otechestvo, 
LDPR), or hierarchical (KPRF). Only Yabloko and the 
Union of Right-Wing Forces (SPS) have some 
grassroots character; but Yabloko lost standing in last 
year’s Duma election, and SPS’ success was related to 
its endorsement of the war in Chechnya. Regarding 
regional politics, most governors have immense 
power-in the worst cases, they preside in a feudal-like 
manner.
The third and perhaps central reason for the lack of 
interest articulation is the stunted growth of the middle 
class in Russia-an incipient middle class was hit hard 
by the August 1998 financial crisis. The middle class 
is the bulwark of democracy for several reasons. They
4
The author has visited over a dozen Russian regions during the 
past 18 months; these observations are based on discussions with 
Russians across the country.
48
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
have a vested interest in the system-the middle class 
benefit from property rights and actively support the 
rule of law to protect these rights. The middle class 
have the “leisure time” to engage in interest articulation 
and political activity. And members of this class 
typically feel empowered to affect their political 
environment; Americans, for example, tend to form 
groups to advance causes.
Probably for a combination of these reasons, 
interest articulation is a key missing element of Russian 
democracy. The Russian political landscape is not 
ready for political parties as we know them in the West. 
U.S. assistance, with noble goals, has promoted 
political party building, but with quite limited success.
Looking Ahead
Our most successful programs, not surprisingly, 
represent the future of U.S. assistance for democratic 
reform in Russia. The United States will emphasize 
grassroots programs, recognizing that the transition will 
be a long one. Exchanges, internet, and support for 
NGOs and independent media will be priorities. We 
will continue the Regional Initiative, which has proven 
to be a dynamic program that targets reformist 
interlocutors in the regions. The U.S. will also 
promote, to the extent resources allow, the growth of 
the middle class in Russia-through programs such as 
support for small business. We will attempt to help this 
key constituency for democracy grow. Finally, we will 
implement a new initiative to strengthen a Russian 
school of public policy at Moscow State University. 
An American university will work in partnership with 
Moscow State to improve training for aspiring and 
current officials in budgeting, management, ethics, and 
a range of other governance-related issues.
Americans should have no illusions that we can 
create democracy in Russia. Russian democracy is for 
Russians to create, if they so choose. But we do have 
strong programs in place, programs that are making a 
contribution to the long-term process of democratic 
reform.
Clifford Kupchan is Deputy Coordinator of U.S. 
Assistance to the New Independent States at the U.S. 
Department of State. The views contained in this article 
are solely those of the author, and do not reflect the 
views of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. 
government.
49
